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Leveraging the Courts to Protect Women’s Fundamental Rights at
the Intersection of Family-Wage Work Structures and Women’s
Role as Wage Earner and Primary Caregiver
JILL MAXWELL
INTRODUCTION
The gap between men’s and women’s labor force participation steadily
narrowed for over two decades until progress slowed in the mid-1990s.1 Before
the mid-1990s, “[w]omen, especially married mothers with young children,
continued to enter the labor force in ever-growing numbers. They integrated
previously male occupations, especially middle-class occupations, and narrowed
the earnings gap with men more in the 1980s than in any other decade . . . .”2
Women’s labor force participation peaked at sixty percent in 1999 and has
plateaued, and even declined, since then.3 The plateau in progress that has
characterized the pattern of gender workplace equality since the mid-1990s
cannot be explained as “structural or broadly ideological.”4 It is most likely the
result of a “specifically antifeminist backlash in the popular culture.”5 This antifeminist backlash co-opted the feminist rhetoric of choice and equality by
describing career mothers who leave the workplace as “opting” for full-time
motherhood, even if the “choice” was prompted “by unsupportive work

 J.D. 2007, Brooklyn Law School. Special thanks to New York City civil rights attorney, Jenn
Rolnick Borchetta of Beldock Levine & Hoffman LLP for inspiring me to write this article and the
many brainstorming sessions at its inception. Thanks also to the staff and editors of the Duke Journal
of Gender Law & Policy for their thoughtful comments.
1. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, CHANGES IN MENS AND WOMENS LABOR FORCE PARTICIPATION
RATES
(2007) [hereinafter MEN AND WOMEN IN THE LABOR FORCE] available at
http://www.bls.gov/opub/ted/2007/jan/wk2/art03.htm; BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, WOMEN IN
THE LABOR FORCE, 1970–2009 (2011) [hereinafter WOMEN IN THE LABOR FORCE] available at
http://bls.gov/opub/ted/2011/ted_20110105.htm (stating that women’s employment peaked in
1999).
2. David Cotter, Joan M. Hermsen & Reeve Vanneman, End of Gender Revolution? Gender Role
Attitudes from 1977 to 2008, 117 AM. J. SOC. 259, 283 (2011);. see also id. at 265 fig.2 (comparing
employment rates of married fathers and married mothers with a spouse present and at least one
own-child in the household); BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, SHARE OF MARRIED-COUPLE FAMILIES WITH
AN EMPLOYED MOTHER AT ITS LOWEST, 1994–2010 (2011) [hereinafter EMPLOYED MOTHERS] available at
http://bls.gov/opub/ted/2011/ted_20110506.htm; BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, LABOR FORCE
PARTICIPATION RATES AMONG MOTHERS (2010) [hereinafter LABOR FORCE] available at
http://bls.gov/opub/ted/2010/ted_20100507.htm.
3. WOMEN IN THE LABOR FORCE, supra note 1.
4. Cotter et al., supra note 2, at 260–61.
5. Id. at 260.
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environments or increased job demands.”6 By using a feminist rhetoric of
“choice” to describe the pattern of women’s departure from the workplace in
favor of full-time caregiving, the rhetoric remains insulated from broad criticism,
perpetuates an inaccurate image of women’s complicated life reality as
wageworker and caregiver, and maintains a status quo workplace structure that
is inherently discriminatory against women.
As this article highlights through statistics and anecdotes, a woman’s
“choice” to leave the workplace—if the option exists at all—is not as simple as
popular culture would let us believe. Rather, most women, including married
women, need to work to support their families.7 But women are also society’s
primary caregivers of children and the elderly, whether out of necessity,8
conformance to traditional gender roles,9 or choice.10 Because the American
workplace structure remains rooted in the family-wage ideal,11 in which a male
breadwinner and a female homemaker comprise each household, women must
fit their family caregiving responsibilities into a workplace structure defined
around the ideal worker, who does not have such responsibilities.12 The result is
the marginalization and exclusion of women from work and stagnant progress
towards workplace equality.13 Although women comprise close to half of the
workforce, they lag behind men in wages and leadership positions,14 and
continue to be discriminated against because of their caregiver status.15 And,
although popular culture focuses on women in higher-income jobs and
households, women in low- and middle-income jobs—those with the least
flexible jobs and the most need for the income—carry the heaviest burden.16

6. Id. at 283–84.
7. See EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE: UNLAWFUL
DISPARATE TREATMENT OF WORKERS WITH CAREGIVING RESPONSIBILITIES 6 (2007) [hereinafter
DISPARATE TREATMENT] available at http://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/caregiving.html (last visited
Oct. 4, 2012) (stating “[i]ncome from women’s employment is important to the economic security of
many families, particularly among lower-paid workers, and accounts for over one-third of the income
in families where both parents work”); LABOR FORCE, supra note 2; MADELEINE M. KUNIN, THE NEW
FEMINIST AGENDA: DEFINING THE NEXT REVOLUTION FOR WOMEN, WORK, AND FAMILY 138 (2012).
8. Over nineteen percent of family households (defined as persons living together and related
to each other by birth, marriage, or adoption) are headed by women with no husband present. See
U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, 2010 AMERICAN COMMUNITY SURVEY 1-YEAR ESTIMATES, table B11001 (2010),
available at http://factfinder2.census.gov. While other unrelated individuals may live in some of these
households and contribute to caregiving, there is no available data about how much these individuals
contribute. It is likely that single mother heads of households are the only available caregivers in at
least some of these households. See also KUNIN, supra note 7, at 138 (stating that “in many households,
mothers have to do everything because they are single parents”).
9. SHARON LERNER, WAR ON MOMS 49–50 (2010).
10. Lisa Belkin, The Opt-out Revolution, N.Y. TIMES MAGAZINE, Oct. 26, 2003, at 44.
11. See infra notes 23–24 and accompanying text.
12. Joan C. Williams, Deconstructing Gender, 87 MICH. L. REV. 797, 822 (1989) (adopting the term
“ideal worker” to describe a worker without childcare responsibilities).
13. Cotter et al., supra note 2, at 265.
14. Joan Williams & Rachel Dempsey, And the Oscar Goes to . . . a Man: Gender Bias at the Top,
HUFFINGTON POST, (Jan. 27, 2012, 11:35 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/joan-williams/andthe-oscar-goes-toa-ma_b_1235169.html?ref=tw.
15. DISPARATE TREATMENT, supra note 7, at 6.
16. See id. at 5.

Maxwell Paginated Proof (Do Not Delete)

12/13/2012 10:10 AM

LEVERAGING THE COURTS TO PROTECT WOMEN’S FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS

129

This article argues that the stagnant progress in workplace equality results
in part from the persistence of family-wage barriers. Family-wage barriers arise
at the intersection of a workplace designed around a worker without family
caregiving responsibilities and women’s role as primary caregivers.17 These
barriers manifest as work structures that favor a worker without caregiving
responsibilities,18 and as policies and practices that penalize caregivers directly or
indirectly, including strict adherences to work structures designed around the
ideal worker.19 Courts recognize mistaken gender stereotype-based assumptions
about a caregiver’s job performance as sex discrimination.20 But they have had
few opportunities and been reluctant to recognize that family-wage barriers
implicate and infringe on women’s fundamental constitutional rights, regardless
of the evidence of stereotyped assumptions.21 Focusing on mothers,22 this article
highlights the equal protection and substantive due process rights at stake for
working women subjected to unfavorable treatment because of their status as
caregivers, as distinguished from unfavorable treatment because of genderstereotyped assumptions based on that status. Unaddressed violations of these
rights that result from a state’s maintenance of family-wage barriers explain, in
part, the stagnant progress of women in the workplace since the mid-1990s23 and
reinforce gender stereotypes. Equal protection jurisprudence has fallen short of
recognizing that family-wage barriers are an issue of equality and, therefore,
helps perpetuate employment inequality between men and women. This article
explores the role that impact litigation and the courts can have in breaking down
family-wage barriers with prophylactic remedies that change the workplace
structure.24
Section I discusses the social construction of the workplace structure around
the family-wage ideal, in which each household has a male devoted exclusively
to paid wage work and a female devoted exclusively to family and household
caretaking. It discusses the way in which the law maintains and challenges the
work/home dichotomy, paving the way for women’s presence in the workplace,
but falling short of affecting full equality. Although women entered the
workforce in recent decades, inflexible work structures persist. As a result, the

17. Caregiving responsibilities refer to informal, unpaid, family caregiving responsibilities, as
distinguished from formal, paid caregiving arrangements.
18. Williams, supra note 12, at 822–23.
19. DISPARATE TREATMENT, supra note 7, at 5.
20. Chadwick v. WellPoint, Inc., 561 F.3d 38, 44 (1st Cir. 2009).
21. Walsh v. Nat’l Computer Sys., 332 F.3d 1150, 1159–61 (8th Cir. 2003).
22. This article focuses on working mothers, but uses the broad term “caregiver” as a reminder
that women’s caregiving is not limited to their role as mothers. Many of the principles and strategies
discussed could inform claims on behalf of caregivers generally. Although the focus is on women and
women plaintiffs because this is an issue of women’s equality, parallel arguments might be made on
behalf of male caregivers that challenge the same deficiency in the law.
23. Cotter et al., supra note 2, at 265.
24. This article focuses specifically on the family-wage barriers to women’s workplace
attachment in light of the stagnant progress of women’s equal employment opportunity in recent
decades. Undeniably, when men conform to the stereotypical role of a woman by becoming
caregivers, their constitutional rights are also implicated. Nevertheless, discrimination against
workers with caregiving responsibilities remains an issue of gender equality because in either case—a
male or female caregiver—employees are penalized for assuming the stereotypical female role.
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promise of equal employment opportunity can only be realized by women
without caregiving responsibilities, women who are able to fit their caregiving
responsibilities into inflexible work structures, or women whose professions
afford them flexibility.25
Section II explores women’s continued role as primary caregivers, despite
their increased presence in the workplace. It highlights the way in which
women’s role as primary caregiver and the inflexible workplace structure
perpetuates family-wage barriers.
Section II discusses the particular
vulnerability of women in low- and middle-income jobs.
Section III addresses the role of impact litigation in breaking down familywage barriers. It argues that, impact litigation, regardless of the risks involved,
has a significant place in law and social change movements. Without impact
litigation to educate the courts, legislation and grassroots organizing result in
limited progress. In addition to educating the courts about an issue, litigation
can spark and support legislation. Section III argues that litigation strategies
must accompany any efforts to eliminate family-wage barriers.
Section IV discusses the fundamental constitutional rights implicated by
family-wage barriers and the litigation strategies that raise these constitutional
claims. It begins by arguing that Title VII and the Family Medical Leave Act do
not fully protect and are no substitute for the rights guaranteed by the
Constitution. Section IV(A) focuses on the equal protection right to equal
employment opportunity. It argues that the Supreme Court has already laid a
foundation for recognizing family-wage barriers to women’s workplace
attachment as an issue of gender equality. And it proposes a modified
framework for courts to use in analyzing these claims to effectively address the
allegations of rights violations that arise from a state’s maintenance of familywage barriers. Section IV(B) highlights the substantive due process rights to
pursue an occupation and to bear and raise children. Although these rights have
not been recognized in the family responsibilities discrimination context and
might be difficult to establish, raising these claims helps frame family-wage
barriers as an issue of constitutional liberty.
Section V discusses the power of federal courts to impose prophylactic
remedies for fundamental rights violations, and proposes that the courts require
changes to workplace structures that eliminate family-wage barriers and prevent
continued violations.26 In addition to increasing women’s access to employment
by decreasing disparate treatment and harassment of caregivers, the elimination
of family-wage barriers challenges the family-wage ideal. The notion of an
“ideal worker” will be re-conceptualized without reference to caregiving
responsibilities, and traditional gender roles will start to be dismantled at home.
As discussed below, equal protection clause jurisprudence evolved in
response to the feminist critique of the 1960s and 1970s and led to women’s
increased workforce participation. Jurisprudence must continue to evolve in

25. See, e.g., Anne-Marie Slaughter, Why Women Still Can’t Have It All, THE ATLANTIC (July/Aug.
2012), at 85.
26. In addition to workplace structure, which is the focus of this article, other factors contribute
to the lag in progress towards women’s workplace equality, including reproductive freedom and
affordable childcare.
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order to fully protect women’s constitutional rights now that women’s role has
changed to that of caregiver and wage earner. A next step in that evolution is
acknowledging that family-wage barriers implicate fundamental rights and
remedying rights violations resulting from family-wage barriers. Impact
litigation puts these issues before the courts and gives them the opportunity to
take this step.
I. THE FAMILY-WAGE IDEAL AND THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF THE WORKPLACE
STRUCTURE
American workplace structure is rooted in and shaped around the familywage ideal: a conception “that the nuclear family should consist of an
independent male breadwinner, a dependent female caregiver, and
children . . . .”27 As Catherine Albiston chronicles, the family-wage ideal
originated during the age of industrialization in the eighteenth and nineteenth
centuries, when some productive activities shifted out of the home.28 “This shift
created two separate spheres of activity: the workplace,” based on a wage labor
system, and the home, defined by task-oriented work.29 Prior to this shift,
caregiving responsibilities were interwoven with all other productive activities,
which could be performed at any pace.30 Notably, work was defined by the
particular task, rather than the hours spent performing a task. When productive
activities shifted to outside the home, these activities became organized in
workplaces and based on regular work patterns controlled by time, rather than
tasks.31 The meaning of “work” became closely associated with the timedisciplined workplace.32 The norm of standardized, full-time wage labor outside
the home ultimately came to define work itself.33
Although women performed wage labor, their work was increasingly lowwage, unskilled, temporary, or part-time, and socially unacceptable for them to
do.34 As a result, women became associated with the private home, rather than
the public workplace, and their labor became task-oriented, non-wage labor such
as childcare, cooking, and cleaning.35 Task-oriented labor performed at home
became excluded from the definition of “work.”36 This emerging pattern of the

27. Deborah Dinner, The Costs of Reproduction: History and the Legal Construction of Sex Equality, 46
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 415, 419 (2011); See also Joan C. Williams & Heather Boushey, The Three Faces
of Work-Family Conflict: The Poor, the Professionals, and the Missing Middle 3–4 (2010), available at
http://www.worklifelaw.org/pubs/ThreeFacesofWork-FamilyConflict.pdf (“In 1960 only 20 percent
of mothers worked and only 18.5 were unmarried. Because the most common family was comprised
of a male breadwinner and stay-at-home mother, employers were able to shape jobs around that
ideal, with the expectation that the breadwinner was available for work anytime, anywhere, and for
as long as his employer needed him.”).
28. Catherine Albiston, Institutional Inequality, 2009 WIS. L. REV. 1093, 1109 (2009).
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 1109–10.
32. See id. at 1110–11.
33. See id. at 1111.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 1109, 1111.
36. See id. at 1111.
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gendered division of labor was considered the morally appropriate
arrangement.37
The law further contributed to the gradual disassociation of task-oriented
labor performed at home from the concept of work.38 For example, work that
gave rise to property rights only included labor performed outside the home.39
Furthermore, the law perpetuated the family-wage system in the nineteenth and
early twentieth centuries by upholding restrictions on women’s participation in
work outside the home. These restrictions were based on an idea of the
“constitution of the family organization, which is founded in the divine
ordinance, as well as in the nature of things, [and] indicates the domestic sphere
as that which properly belongs to the domain and functions of
womanhood . . . .”40 In upholding these laws, the Supreme Court opined that
“nature” was “repugnant to the idea of a woman adopting a distinct and
independent career from that of her husband.”41 The Supreme Court adopted,
endorsed, and perpetuated the gender segregated work/home dichotomy.
State laws, such as those restricting women’s working hours, were upheld
based on women’s status as present or future mothers.42 These laws reinforced
and were socially accepted because of the cultural expectation of the male
breadwinner-female caregiver norm.43 They contributed to the establishment of
work as a fundamental element of men’s identity and domesticity as the
fundamental element of women’s identity.44
In response to this historical division of work, legal feminists developed a
critique of the family-wage system in the 1960s and 1970s.45 The feminist critique
led to antidiscrimination legislation and the evolution of constitutional
jurisprudence recognizing women’s rights to social and economic
independence.46 Constitutional law began to “place[] a spotlight on the
burdensome nature of legislation that confined women to a separate sphere” and

37. See id. at 1119. As Albiston points out, not only was the gendered division of labor a result of
an ideology that associated women with domesticity, but it also resulted from the exclusion of
women from many forms of wage labor as a means to control competition between workers as
opportunities for economic support, such as land ownership, diminished.
38. Justice Ruth B. Ginsburg, Constitutional Adjudication in the United States as a Means of
Advancing the Equal Stature of Men and Women Under the Law, 26 HOFSTRA L. REV. 263, 266 (1997).
39. Albiston, supra note 28, at 1109, 1118.
40. Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. 130, 141 (1872) (stating “civil law, as well as nature herself, has
always recognized a wide difference in the respective spheres and destinies of man and woman. Man
is, or should be, woman’s protector and defender.”).
41. Id.
42. The first of such laws was enacted in Massachusetts in 1874 and limited the amount of time
that women could work per day to ten hours. By 1900 fourteen states had enacted similar laws and
by the mid-1960s all states had some type of legislation restricting women from working. Jo Freeman,
Revolution for Women in Law and Public Policy, in WOMEN: A FEMINIST PERSPECTIVE, 365–404 (Jo
Freeman ed., 1995); see also Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412, 422 (1908) (upholding an Oregon law
which restricted the employment of women in factories, laundries, or other “mechanical
establishments” to ten hours per day).
43. Albiston, supra note 28, at 1120.
44. Id. at 1121.
45. Dinner, supra note 27, at 419.
46. Ginsburg, supra note 38, at 268–70.
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to recognize how the “state impeded both men and women from pursuit of the
very opportunities and styles of life that could enable them to break away from
traditional patterns and develop their full, human capacities.”47
These developments paved the way for women to enter the workforce in the
last half of the twentieth century. Since the 1970s, there has been a steep rise in
women’s workforce participation, including the participation of women with
children.48 Today, women make up almost half (forty-eight percent) of the
workforce49 and “the proportion of families that fit the traditional breadwinner
model has declined substantially.”50 In seventy percent of households with
children, both parents work, and nearly a quarter of Americans care for elders.51
Nonetheless, the workplace structure remains inflexible and designed
around an ideal worker without caregiving responsibilities.52 For working
parents, shouldering caregiving and work responsibilities presents a heavy and
exacting burden. One survey revealed that thirty percent of those surveyed had
to cut down on work for at least one day each week in order to address family
care needs.53 Over sixty-four percent of American families with children work
more than eighty hours per week.54 Almost “three-quarters of working adults
say they have little or no control over their schedule.”55 Moreover, lower-income
workers have the least control over their schedule.56 One study found that onethird of working-class workers cannot decide when to take breaks, almost sixty
percent cannot choose the start and endtimes of their workdays, and fifty-three
percent cannot take time off to care for sick children.57 Sixty-eight percent of
working-class families are entitled to less than two weeks of vacation and sick
time combined.58
These inflexible workplace structures can ultimately mean unemployment
or part-time and temporary employment for workers with caregiving
responsibilities.59 Inflexible hours are also associated with higher stress levels
and poorer health, further contributing to the threat of economic insecurity.60 The

47. Id. at 270.
48. Albiston, supra note 28, at 1124–25.
49. DISPARATE TREATMENT, supra note 7, at 1.
50. Albiston, supra note 28, at 1125.
51. Williams & Boushey, supra note 27, at 4, 36. Indeed, having all adults in a household
employed is an economic necessity for most families.
52. Id. at 3–4.
53. CENTER FOR WORKLIFE LAW, ONE SICK CHILD AWAY FROM BEING FIRED: WHEN “OPTING OUT”
IS NOT AN OPTION 11 [hereinafter ONE SICK CHILD] (2006).
54. Id. at 8.
55. Id.; see also NEW AM. FOUND., THE WAY WOMEN WORK (2004), available at
http://www.newamerica.net/files/archive/Doc_File_1504_1.pdf (stating that fifty-three percent of
working women caregivers say they cannot take time off from work to care for a child; forty-nine
percent say they lack flexibility in starting and ending times at work).
56. ONE SICK CHILD, supra note 53, at 8.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. LERNER, supra note 9, at 6–15 (telling the story of Devorah Gartner, discussed infra Section
III(A)(2); see also ONE SICK CHILD, supra note 53, at 9–10.
60. Kristina Fiore, Employees Healthier When Boss is Flexible, MEDPAGE TODAY (Feb. 17, 2010),
http://www.medpagetoday.com/PublicHealthPolicy/WorkForce/18529.
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difficulties that most workers have in balancing caregiving responsibilities with
work illustrate the burdens imposed by family-wage barriers. As discussed in
the following section, women bear a disproportionate share of the burden
because they remain society’s primary caregivers. As a result, family-wage
barriers raise issues of women’s employment equality and liberty. Impact
litigation strategies should be used to raise these issues before the courts so that
they can be recognized as implicating the constitutional rights of women.
II. THE DISPROPORTIONATE IMPACT OF AN INFLEXIBLE WORKPLACE STRUCTURE ON
WOMEN
Despite the progress in employment equality since the 1970s, as women’s
presence has expanded into the work sphere, men’s presence has not
proportionally expanded into the home sphere. Women remain society’s
primary caregivers61 and perform the vast majority of domestic chores.62 The
division of domestic labor in heterosexual couples has not kept pace with
changes in women’s lives outside the home; women continue to do the vast
majority of the housework and caregiving.63 As women head the majority of
single-parent households,64 the burden on working parents that results from an
inflexible workplace falls disproportionately on women and limits their
employment opportunities.
The limitation on women’s employment
opportunities subsequently affects their economic security.65
Despite the steep increase in women’s labor force participation until the
mid-1990s, women remain at the margins of the workplace. Women, particularly
those with children, continue to face significant barriers to employment because
of inflexible workplace structures based on an outdated ideal.66 Women fill
fewer leadership and management positions than men.67 Full-time working
women’s median weekly wages are about eighty percent of full-time working
men’s wages.68 Annually, a full-time working woman earns seventy-seven cents
to every dollar a man earns.69 Twenty-seven percent of working women work
part-time, compared to thirteen percent of men.70
61.
62.
63.
64.

DISPARATE TREATMENT, supra note 7, at 2.
LERNER, supra note 9, at 39.
Id. at 38.
See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, MORE YOUNG ADULTS ARE LIVING IN THEIR PARENTS’ HOME, CENSUS
BUREAU REPORTS (2011) available at http://www.census.gov/newsroom/releases/archives/
families_households/cb11-183.html (indicating that eighty-seven percent of children who live with
one parent live with their mother); U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, AMERICAN FAMILIES AND LIVING
ARRANGEMENTS: 2011 Table C3 (2011), available at http://www.census.gov/hhes/families/
data/cps2011.html.
65. See DISPARATE TREATMENT, supra note 7, at 3–4.
66. Williams & Boushey, supra note 27, at 1126.
67. Williams & Dempsey, supra note 14.
68. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, WOMEN’S EARNINGS AS A PERCENT OF MEN’S IN 2010 (2012)
available at http://www.bls.gov/opub/ted/2012/ted_20120110.htm; see Albiston, supra note 28, at
1126.
69. ARIANE HEGEWISCH & ANGELA EDWARDS, INSTITUTE FOR WOMEN’S POLICY, THE GENDER
WAGE GAP: 2011 (Sept. 2012), available at http://www.iwpr.org/publications/pubs/the-genderwage-gap-2011-1/at_download/file.
70. U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, WOMEN IN THE LABOR FORCE: A DATABOOK Table 20 (2011) [hereinafter
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Furthermore, when women become mothers they are increasingly
marginalized in the workplace.71 Motherhood causes their earnings to flatten or
decrease.72 If mothers remain in the workforce, they are relegated into lowerpaying positions or part-time positions with little opportunity for
advancement.73 Women are more likely than men to work part-time for reasons
related to child care problems, family or personal obligations, or school; fortyfive percent of women who work part-time say that the reason is related to worklife balance, as compared to twelve percent of men.74 Working mothers are held
to higher performance standards in terms of attendance and punctuality, and
working mothers who take advantage of leave policies are evaluated more
negatively than workers who do not take advantage of leave policies.75 As
discussed more fully below, employers harass and retaliate against workers
because of their caregiving responsibilities.76
Women are more likely than men to be alienated from the workplace after
having children. When childcare fails, women are more likely than men to take
time off work.77 In general, women’s careers are more likely than men’s to be
scaled back or abandoned entirely in favor of caregiving responsibilities.78
Although this might result from personal (or household) preference, considering
the fact that many women want and need to work to support themselves and
their families it is more likely the combination of several factors. Inflexible
workplace structures and discrimination79 make working simply not possible for
women. Indeed, eighty-seven percent of highly educated women cite inflexible
work schedules as a key reason for why they left the workforce.80
Existing laws have made progress in opening up employment opportunities
to those who are able to operate within a workplace structure developed around
a male breadwinner norm. But judicial precedent interpreting Title VII and the
Equal Protection Clause ignores the extent to which work structures are based on

2011 DATABOOK]; Albiston, supra note 28, at 1126.
71. Joan C. Williams & Nancy Segal, Beyond the Maternal Wall: Relief for Family Caregivers Who Are
Discriminated Against on the Job, 26 HARV. WOMEN’S L.J. 77, 90–91 (2003).
72. LERNER, supra note 9, at 18.
73. Albiston, supra note 28, at 1126.
74. THE WAY WOMEN WORK, supra note 55.
75. Albiston, supra note 28, at 1126–27.
76. See, e.g., Williams & Boushey, supra note 27, at 45 (stating “[a]mong low-income women, this
kind of discrimination is often triggered when a woman announces her pregnancy at work; women
in the middle are more likely to face bias when they return to work after the baby is born”).
77. ONE SICK CHILD, supra note 53, at 11 (highlighting that when a tag-teaming arrangement fails,
almost one-quarter of men compared to over one-third of women had to take time off from work).
78. LERNER, supra note 9, at 52; see also AMERICAN ASSOC. OF UNIV. WOMEN, THE SIMPLE TRUTH
ABOUT THE GENDER PAY GAP 9 (2010) (stating that ten years after college graduation, twenty-three
percent of mothers verses one percent of fathers were out of the workforce; seventeen percent of
mothers verses two percent of fathers working part-time).
79. These are the barriers to women’s workplace attachment that are the focus of this article.
Nevertheless, several other factors prevent women from accessing employment opportunities equal
to men, including lack of affordable childcare and reproductive choice, both of which are related to
women’s status as primary caregiver.
80. Williams & Boushey, supra note 27, at 54.
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outdated conceptions of family, gender, and work.81 Women’s limited access to
employment opportunities equal to those of their male counterparts threatens
women’s economic security.82
Furthermore, women already account for the majority of low-wage workers
and poor people.83 The women in lower- and middle-income groups, who hold
some of the least flexible jobs and rely heavily on income from consistent work,84
have the most limited access to quality, affordable, and dependable childcare,
and face the most precarious circumstances.85 Low-income working families
account for more than half of working parents.86 Single mothers head about onequarter of households; the median income of single-mother households is only
one-third of that for married-couple families, and the majority of poor children
live in single-mother households.87 Low- and middle-income women are more
likely than their higher-income counterparts to miss work because their childcare
arrangements fail, presumably because they are less likely to rely on childcare
centers than their higher-income counterparts.88 Missing work jeopardizes their
employment.89
Additionally, in contrast “to highly paid workers, keeping less-well-paid
workers is less likely to be a money-saving endeavor” for employers.90 This
makes low- and middle-income workers less likely to be granted flexibility in
their work structure and more likely to be fired.91 Without being required to
offer flexible work structures, employers have little incentive to change the
workplace structure for any worker.92 Employers have the least incentive to
make changes for the workers who need them the most.
Judicial precedent treats strict, inflexible work schedules and employment
policies based on an ideal worker without caregiving responsibilities—a male
worker—as inherent to the nature of work, rather than the result of social
constructions.93 By requiring all workers to operate within an inherently
discriminatory work structure, the law perpetuates the male breadwinner-female

81. Albiston, supra note 28, at 1153–54.
82. THE WAY WOMEN WORK, supra note 55.
83. LERNER, supra note 9, at 71.
84. Low-income women are the least likely women, across income groups, to be employed. They
tend to have access to better childcare than middle-income families because it is subsidized. Williams
& Boushey, supra note 27, at 36.
85. “Women with high-paying jobs are far more likely to get flextime, paid vacations, paid
maternity leave, and sick days than are women with lower-paying ones, despite the fact that lowerincome workers can least afford to be docked pay or lose a job.” LERNER, supra note 9, at 62–63.
86. Id. at 71.
87. THE WOMEN’S LEGAL DEF. & EDUC. FUND, SINGLE MOTHERHOOD IN THE U.S. – A SNAPSHOT
(2012), available at http://www.legalmomentum.org/our-work/women-and-poverty/resources-publications/single-mothers-snapshot.pdf.
88. ONE SICK CHILD, supra note 53, at 10–11; Williams & Boushey, supra note 27, at 8 (stating that
thirty percent of low- and middle-income families rely on childcare facilities; thirty-seven percent of
professional-managerial families rely on childcare facilities).
89. ONE SICK CHILD, supra note 53, at 11.
90. LERNER, supra note 9, at 66.
91. Id. at 66–67.
92. See id. at 67.
93. Albiston, supra note 28, at 1153–54.
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caregiver model and the exclusion of women from employment opportunities.94
Comments based on stereotypes about the roles of men and women continue to
appear in judicial opinions and undoubtedly cloud the lens through which
family-wage barriers are viewed.95 The discussion that follows reveals the extent
to which rights relating to work developed irrespective of those rights relating to
caregiving, illustrating how the law maintains the dichotomy between work and
family. That one remedy simultaneously protects these rights undermines
judicial precedent’s treatment of these spheres as separate from, and opposed to,
one another.96 Impact litigation can educate courts, legislatures, and the public
about the fundamental rights at stake at the intersection of outdated, inflexible
work structures, women’s workforce participation, and caregiving
responsibilities.
III. USING IMPACT LITIGATION TO ELIMINATE FAMILY-WAGE BARRIERS TO WOMEN’S
WORKPLACE ATTACHMENT
This article’s focus on constitutional impact litigation strategies
supplements the existing family responsibilities discrimination scholarship,
which predominately proposes legislation, consensus-building strategies and
organizing for removing family-wage barriers to women’s workplace
attachment.97
Undoubtedly, constraints accompany constitutional impact
litigation. Impact litigation can be costly, time-consuming, and risky.98 But
courts inevitably have a role in any law and social change agenda; strategically
leveraging that role is essential to eliminating family-wage barriers.99 As
Douglas NeJaime argues, “sophisticated social movement lawyers engage in

94. See, e.g., Idhardt v. Sara Lee Corp., 118 F.3d 1151, 1154 (7th Cir. 1997) (holding that there was
no Title VII violation where a pregnant part-time employee is terminated instead of less senior fulltime employees); Armstrong v. Flowers Hosp. Inc., 33 F.3d 1308, 1316–17 (11th Cir. 1994) (holding
that an employer was not obligated to change assignments of a pregnant employee to accommodate
her pregnancy); Gee-Thomas v. Cingular Wireless, 324 F. Supp. 2d 875, 880–81 (M.D. Tenn. 2004)
(granting summary judgment to defendant in a case where plaintiff was a mother of five and alleged
she was not considered for a promotion because of her status as a mother when there was evidence
that the man who received the position was a father); Bass v. Chem. Banking Corp., No. 94 Civ. 8833,
1996 WL 374151, *5 (S.D.N.Y. July 2, 1996) (granting summary judgment to defendant on plaintiff’s
failure to promote her claim that she was on track to be promoted before becoming a mother and was
passed over for promotions after having children because of plaintiff’s lack of a male comparator).
95. See, e.g., Lust v. Sealy, Inc., 383 F.3d 580, 583 (7th Cir. 2004) (holding that a reasonable jury
could find sex discrimination in the case of an employee who was passed over for a promotion
because of her childcare responsibilities, but also stating that “[r]ealism requires acknowledgement
that the average mother is more sensitive than the average father to the possibly disruptive effect on
children of moving to another city . . .”).
96. See Ginsburg, supra note 38, at 269–70.
97. Joan C. Williams and Elizabeth S. Westfall propose Title VII litigation strategies for
overcoming the maternal wall. Joan C. Williams & Elizabeth S. Westfall, Deconstructing the Maternal
Wall: Strategies for Vindicating the Civil Rights of “Carers” in the Workplace, 13 DUKE J. GENDER L. &
POL’Y 31, 37–39 (2006).
98. See Douglas NeJaime, Winning Through Losing, 96 IOWA L. REV. 941, 965–66, 955 (2011).
99. See id. at 965–66, 968–69 (describing litigation loss as a means of raising awareness and
describing how social movement lawyers strategically leverage the court as an element of a social
change agenda).
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multidimensional advocacy that moves beyond, but not without, litigation.”100
Litigation helps educate the Supreme Court and lower federal courts about
a changing cultural landscape and can make them more receptive to progressive
legislation or to broader interpretations of preexisting statutes, such as Title VII
and the Family Medical Leave Act.101 The judiciary and Congress share a
symbiotic relationship in remedying constitutional violations. Full protection
against gender discrimination will only progress as far as the narrowest
definition of a rights violation.102 Courts need help to implement and enforce
their decisions; the legislature can supply that help.103 Conversely, when faced
with the application of a statute intended to have broad-sweeping remedies, a
court not adequately versed in the cultural climate of the era might not apply the
statute as intended. Indeed, the Supreme Court tends towards narrow
interpretations of employment discrimination laws. Two examples, discussed
shortly, are the Supreme Court’s failure to recognize Title VII claims of
pregnancy discrimination104 and equal pay.105 Additionally, the Supreme Court
defines the scope of constitutional rights and appropriate remedies to protect
those rights. Judicial interpretation is the driving force in the evolution of the
Constitution’s protections.106 For example, in 1873, the Supreme Court held that
women could be legally excluded from the practice of law in Illinois;107 in 1996
the Supreme Court held that Virginia could not exclude qualified women from
the Virginia Military Institute.108 Claims of constitutional rights violations give
the Supreme Court an opportunity to recognize a fundamental right in a
particular context unique to the era. Such claims also give the Supreme Court an
opportunity to change a cumbersome, widely criticized analytical framework,
such as McDonnell Douglas.109 These claims have the potential to reform the law

100. Id. at 990.
101. See Williams & Westfall, supra note 97.
102. See Ginsburg, supra note 38, at 270.
103. See Scott L. Cummings, Litigation at Work: Defending Day Laborers in Los Angeles, 58 UCLA L.
REV. 1617, 1675–76 (2011).
104. Gen. Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 138 (1976).
105. Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 550 U.S. 618, 628–29 (2007).
106. See Ginsburg, supra note 38, at 268–69; Evan Wolfson, Crossing the Threshold: Equal Marriage
Rights for Lesbians and Gay Men and the Intra-Community Critique, 21 N.Y.U. REV. LAW & SOC. CHANGE
567, 580 (1993–1995).
107. Bradwell v. Illinois, 16 U.S. 130, 142 (1873).
108. United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 555–56 (1996).
109. See U.S. Postal Serv. Bd. of Governors v. Aiken, 460 U.S. 711, 715–716 (1983) (adopting a
flexible interpretation of the McDonnell Douglas requirements). In Aiken, the Court held “[a]ll courts
have recognized that the question facing triers of fact in discrimination cases is both sensitive and
difficult. The prohibitions against discrimination contained in the Civil Rights Act of 1964 reflect an
important national policy. There will seldom be ‘eyewitness’ testimony as to the employer’s mental
processes. But none of this means that trial courts or reviewing courts should treat discrimination
differently from other ultimate questions of fact. Nor should they make their inquiry even more
difficult by applying legal rules which were devised to govern the allocation of burdens and order of
presentation of proof, in deciding this ultimate question.” Id. (internal quotations omitted); see also
Tex. Dep’t of Comm. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 254–60 (1981) (explaining some of the
difficulties encountered by courts while interpreting the burden-shifting requirements of the
McDonnell Douglas framework); Kenneth R. Davis, The Stumbling Three-Step, Burden-Shifting Approach
in Employment Discrimination Cases, 61 BROOK. L. REV. 703, 703–05 (1995) (explaining various
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as well as spark new legislation.110
Regardless of the ultimate success of a particular case, constitutional
litigation educates the courts about the cultural frame of the era, which can in
turn inform and spark legislative remedies for rights violations. Impact litigation
thus clarifies the scope of constitutional rights in specific contexts and creates a
public record that can encourage grassroots organization and bolster consensusbuilding.111 Therefore, even failed litigation can be a necessary predecessor to
later litigation successes by beginning to transform the claim from something
seemingly impossible to something possible.112 The “sex-plus“ theory of
employment discrimination under Title VII, for example, was unrecognized by
the Supreme Court in several cases before it was finally accepted.113
A litigation loss can also spur legislation that responds to and attempts to
rectify an unjust outcome. Litigation can emphasize the urgency of legislative
action.114 Congress passed the Pregnancy Discrimination Act (“PDA”)115 after
women’s rights activists failed to convince the Supreme Court to treat
pregnancy discrimination as a sex-equality issue. In passing the PDA, Congress
relied on the same arguments advanced in the Supreme Court.116 Similarly, the
Fair Pay Act117 was enacted to remedy the Supreme Court’s rejection of an equal
pay claim under Title VII. In enacting the Fair Pay Act, Congress relied on
Justice Ginsburg’s dissent articulating the discrimination against women and the
need for a legislative response.118
Additionally, courts are public forums; litigation creates a public record of
personal experiences and tells an individual story.119 Even if litigation is
unsuccessful, or perhaps especially if litigation is unsuccessful,120 these personal
stories document a broader social reality. The record of personal stories in
individual cases can garnish public interest in and support for the issue,
mobilizing grassroots or political organizations.121 Again, the Fair Pay Act

criticisms and difficulties courts have encountered while implementing the McDonnell Douglas
framework).
110. Ginsburg, supra note 38, at 270.
111. See, e.g., Scott L. Cummings & Douglas NeJaime, Lawyering for Marriage Equality, 57 UCLA L.
REV. 1235, 1317–18 (2010) (describing the role of litigation in the fight for marriage equality in
California).
112. NeJaime, supra note 98, at 964.
113. Heather M. Kolinsky, Taking Away An Employer’s Free Pass: Making the Case For a More
Sophisticated Sex-Plus Analysis in Employment Discrimination Cases, 36 VT. L. REV. 327, 340–41 (2011).
114. NeJaime, supra note 98, at 998–99.
115. Pregnancy Discrimination Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (1978).
116. Elizabeth M. Schneider, The Dialectic of Rights and Politics: Perspectives From the Women’s
Movement, 61 N.Y.U. L. REV. 589, 641 (1986).
117. Lily Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009, 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e)(5) (2009).
118. NeJaime, supra note 98, at 999.
119. See id. at 1000.
120. Id. at 985 (arguing that “litigation loss may raise consciousness and mobilize constituents, but
it may do so most effectively by inspiring outrage, strengthening resolve, and building a more fervent
feeling of entitlement . . .”).
121. Cummings, supra note 103, at 1622–23 (opining that “litigation may be useful in framing
grievances in justice terms, conferring legitimacy on a movement’s claims, generating favorable
publicity, raising consciousness among a movement’s constituency, and fostering empowerment”).
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exemplifies this. Lilly Ledbetter sued her employer for paying her significantly
less than her male counterparts over the course of her almost twenty-year career.
Her claim was ultimately rejected by the Supreme Court based on the statute of
limitations. But her efforts, which included testifying before Congress, garnered
enough support to amend the law to loosen the statute of limitations for equal
pay claims.
The litigation strategy proposed below asks courts to recognize rights
violations in new contexts and adopt a modified analytical framework that better
allows violations to be remedied. This strategy is inevitably risky because it
encourages courts to recognize constitutional protections in a new context. But
any potential difficulties in bringing these claims, and the possibility that they
might initially fail, do not justify not pursuing them in court. At the very least,
bringing these claims empowers individual women who are forced to choose
between work and caring for their children. These claims bring the complexity
of this choice to the fore.
Ensuring that the most marginalized and vulnerable are entitled to
protections requires establishing that family-wage barriers are an issue of gender
equality and implicate fundamental constitutional rights. Only the Court can
recognize constitutional rights and it can only do so through the cases and
controversies before it. Thus, impact litigation must be used to break down
family-wage barriers and change the status quo.
IV. FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS IMPLICATED BY FAMILY-WAGE BARRIERS TO WOMEN’S
WORKPLACE ATTACHMENT
The presence of family-wage barriers is an issue of constitutional
importance, implicating rights guaranteed by the Equal Protection and Due
Process Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment.122 This section argues that the
state’s perpetuation of family-wage barriers violates women’s right to equal
employment opportunity—as guaranteed by the Equal Protection Clause
(“EPC”)123—and infringes on women’s fundamental right to bear and raise
children and pursue a career of one’s choice—as guaranteed by the Due Process
Clause.124
Highlighting the continued violations of these rights reveals the limits of
federal statutes such as Title VII and the Family Medical Leave Act (“FMLA”)125
in fully ensuring women’s ultimate freedom and equality as guaranteed by the
Constitution. Passed pursuant to Congress’ power to remedy widespread
violations of the EPC, these statutes provide a floor, not a ceiling, in protecting
against and remedying constitutional rights violations. Because it is the body

122. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
123. See Nev. Dep’t of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 726–27, 729–30 (2003) (noting that
Congress retains the power to enact legislation addressing employment discrimination on the basis of
gender both remedially and prophylactically on constitutional grounds).
124. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152–53 (observing that an individual sphere of privacy can be
found in the guarantee of individual liberty under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment).
125. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1991); Family and Medical Leave
Act of 1993, 29 U.S.C. § 2601 (2006).
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charged with defining the scope of the Constitution’s guarantees, the Court can
protect constitutional rights without relying on federal statutes. To the extent
that courts rely on these statutes instead of recognizing constitutional
guarantees, framing women’s workplace attachment as a constitutional issue
resets the appropriate balance of powers between the Supreme Court and the
Legislature.
Recognizing that family-wage barriers implicate constitutional rights
ensures that if and when Congress passes laws affording greater remedies to
family-wage barriers, the laws would be upheld by the Court as valid exercises
of Congress’ Section 5 power.126 Additionally, the laws would have a solid
foundation in EPC rights recognition. In emphasizing the scope of these rights,
this article proposes impact litigation strategies to challenge the discriminatory
workplace structures that courts treat as inherent to work and to urge the courts
to remedy these fundamental rights violations through exercise of their Article
III powers.127
Because women’s workplace attachment is primarily an issue of equality,
this section begins with a discussion of the equal protection rights at stake and
proposes a new framework through which to analyze these equal protection
claims. Following the discussion of possible claims for a violation of the EPC,
this article discusses claims based on the Substantive Due Process Clause.
A. Equal Protection Right to Equal Employment Opportunity
Family-wage barriers to women’s workplace attachment implicate
fundamental rights protected by the EPC of the Fourteenth Amendment. The
EPC states that “[n]o State shall . . . deny to any person within its jurisdiction the
equal protection of the laws.”128 It is well established that the EPC guarantees
freedom from gender discrimination and protects the right to equal employment
opportunity regardless of gender.129 Indeed, Title VII and the FMLA130 were
enacted to enforce this Constitutional right.131 But, while Title VII and the FMLA
have helped change the composition of the workforce, these laws have not
significantly changed the structure of the workplace to incorporate women’s
experience as the primary caregivers.132 In addition to a claim based on
impermissible sex stereotypes, a “sex-plus”133 theory of liability is the primary

126. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5.
127. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2.
128. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
129. Back v. Hastings on Hudson Union Free Sch. Dist., 365 F.3d 107, 117 (2d Cir. 2004).
130. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e; 29 U.S.C. § 2601.
131. Nev. Dep’t of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 726–27 (2003) (acknowledging that the
FMLA was enacted pursuant to Congress’ Section 5 power to enforce the Equal Protection Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment); Ussery v. Louisiana ex rel. Dep’t of Health and Hosps., 150 F.3d 431, 437
(5th Cir. 1998) (indicating that Congress relied on its Section 5 power to abrogate state immunity from
claims under Title VII as the substantive provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment prohibit states
from discriminating on the basis of gender); see United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 532 (1996)
(analyzing an equal protection right to be free from gender discrimination).
132. See supra Sections I–II.
133. “Sex-plus” refers to a policy or practice by which an employer classifies an individual on the
basis of sex plus another characteristic. The employer does not discriminate against an entire class of
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theory through which Title VII protects against disparate treatment of working
mothers.134 But the complainants must allege that they are being treated
differently than a comparable subclass of the opposite sex. This requirement
places significant limitations on the effectiveness of Title VII in achieving full
equality135 because, as the statistics above136 evidence, male caregiver
comparators are not always available.137 As a result, many claims based on this
theory do not survive the initial litigation stages.138
Likewise, EPC gender discrimination jurisprudence targeting sex
stereotypes seeks to, and to some degree does, prevent a state from reinforcing or
forcing individuals into traditional sex roles.139 But the EPC jurisprudence
reinforces time norms and work structures that evolved based on a male worker
without caregiving responsibilities.140 It is, therefore, of limited use in remedying
discrimination against mothers. The EPC jurisprudence focuses on whether an
employer assumed, based on traditional sex-role stereotypes, that a working
mother would not or should not be as dedicated or as good a worker as a man or
a woman without children.141 In this analysis, a “dedicated” or “good” worker is
viewed in the context of a workplace structure designed around a man or a
woman without children.142 Therefore, the sex-stereotype jurisprudence does not
protect a woman who does not conform to the traditional sex-role stereotype of a
working mother, insofar as she is simultaneously a dedicated and good worker
and caregiver, yet cannot fit her caregiving responsibilities into a work structure
designed around workers without such responsibilities. As a result, when
women are faced with the impossible choice between work and family, the equal
employment opportunity ideal succumbs to the male breadwinner-female
caregiver model.143

men or women, but against a subclass of men or women. Back, 365 F.3d at 118–19 nn.7–9.
134. The Supreme Court first recognized that Title VII protects against “sex-plus” discrimination
in 1971. Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp., 400 U.S. 542 (1971) (per curiam). Although the Supreme
Court reversed summary judgment in favor of the defendant-employer, alleged to have
discriminated because of its policy not to hire women with children but permitting the hiring of men
with children, the Court did so because an issue of fact remained as to whether the condition in
question was “a bona fide occupational qualification reasonably necessary to the normal operation of
that particular business or enterprise.” Id. at 544. Marshall’s concurrence disagreed that a bona fide
qualification “could be established by a showing that some women, even the vast majority, with preschool-age children have family responsibilities that interfere with job performance and that men do
not usually have such responsibilities.” Id. (Marshall, J., concurring). Marshall’s concurrence more
accurately captures the law as it has evolved to prohibit sex-stereotyped assumptions about
caregivers as workers.
135. Kolinsky, supra note 113, at 344–47.
136. See supra Section II.
137. Kolinsky, supra note 113, at 345.
138. See, e.g., id. at 344–50.
139. See Nev. Dep’t of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 736–38 (2003).
140. Albiston, supra note 28, at 1154 (arguing that “stereotype theories also run the risk of reifying
time norms and work structures. These theories emphasize that employers may not presume that
pregnant women will take time off work, but they also suggest that if a pregnant woman needs time
off or an accommodation, that would be a different situation and outcome.”).
141. Id. at 1154–55.
142. Williams, supra note 12, at 822.
143. See supra Sections I–II.
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Thus, EPC gender discrimination jurisprudence perpetuates the reification
of sex-stereotyped roles, and in turn perpetuates the stereotypes that it seeks to
eradicate. By failing to adequately address discrimination against mothers, EPC
jurisprudence also tolerates intra-class preferences by allowing discrimination
against those within the protected class of women who conform to the stereotype
of that class. While it is a violation of the EPC to make an employment decision
based on a candidate’s gender, it is not a violation to make a decision based on
her caregiving responsibilities. Employers are permitted to evaluate candidates
based on characteristics that set them apart from their class.144 For this reason,
EPC jurisprudence must evolve to respond to the ways in which family-wage
barriers exclude women from the workforce.
1. Discrimination Against Caregivers is an Issue of Gender Equality
Whether she suffers an outright denial of work or a more subtle form of
discrimination, if a woman faces discrimination because she is a mother or
caregiver, it should be recognized as sex discrimination in violation of the EPC.
After all, “[a] mother is still a woman. And if she is denied work outright because
she is a mother, it is because she is a woman.”145 The Court already laid the
foundation to recognize that family-wage barriers are an issue of women’s
equality.146 In Nevada Department of Human Resources v. Hibbs, the Court
acknowledged that discrimination against women in the workplace can manifest
itself under a guise of practices targeting caregivers, and that discrimination
against caregivers is an issue of gender equality.147 In Hibbs, the Court addressed
whether Congress’ enactment of the FMLA was a valid exercise of Congress’
Section 5 power to enforce the equal protection right to be free from gender
discrimination in the workplace.148 In upholding the FMLA, the Court
determined that the scope of the EPC right to be free from gender discrimination
protects against a state’s “unconstitutional participation in, and fostering of,
gender-based discrimination”149 through the discriminatory application of
facially neutral state laws and policies.150
In Hibbs, the Court reiterated that “[i]t can hardly be doubted that . . .
women still face pervasive, although at times more subtle, discrimination . . . in
the job market.”151 The Congressional findings endorsed by the Court support
the conclusion that adverse action against caregivers is, in fact, adverse action
against women.152 Those findings reveal that “the lack of employment policies to

144. Kolinsky, supra note 113, at 351.
145. AT&T Corp. v. Hulteen, 556 U.S. 701, 727 (2009) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (quoting Phillips v.
Martin Marietta Corp., 416 F.2d 1257, 1262 (5th Cir, 1969) (Brown, C. J., dissenting)).
146. See Nev. Dep’t of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 734 (2003).
147. Id. at 736–37; see also Williams & Segal, supra note 71, at 85–86.
148. Hibbs, 538 U.S. at 738–39.
149. Id. at 735.
150. Id. at 732.
151. Id. at 730 (quoting Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 686 (1973)); see Chadwick v.
WellPoint, Inc., 561 F.3d 38, 44 (1st Cir. 2009) (describing the Hibbs opinion as an opinion where ”the
Supreme Court took judicial notice of the stereotype that women, not men, are responsible for family
caregiving”).
152. See Hibbs, 538 U.S. at 730 (describing discriminatory leave policies).
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accommodate working parents can force individuals to choose between job
security and parenting” and, “due to the nature of the roles of men and women
in our society, the primary responsibility for family caretaking often falls on
women, and such responsibility affects the working lives of women more than it
affects the working lives of men.”153 Taken together, “the lack of employment
policies to accommodate” parents affects the working lives of women more than
men.154 The result is the marginalization of women into part-time, lower-paid, or
lower-positioned jobs.155 A state’s refusal to provide leave is like its maintenance
of family-wage barriers when it takes employment actions based on caregiving—
such as assigning caregivers to undesirable shifts,156 not considering them for
promotions,157 or firing them158—and does not offer alternative work
arrangements for people with caregiving responsibilities. Maintenance of
family-wage barriers “exclude[s] far more women than men from the
workplace.”159 And it “do[es] little to combat the stereotypes about the roles of
male and female employees.”160 Relying on Hibbs, courts can use similar
statistics presented to them in individual cases to recognize an EPC violation
based on the state’s maintenance of family-wage barriers.
An EPC claim based on caregiver status shares the same foundation with,
and is a necessary counterpart to and an extension of, existing jurisprudence that
targets state conduct based on sex stereotypes. The claim based on caregiver
status challenges a state’s reinforcement of traditional sex roles. Until courts
recognize such claims, and for as long as women remain society’s primary
caregivers, women and men alike will be forced into their traditional roles as
caregiver and breadwinner. Women will continue to be marginalized in the
workplace. And, as a result, the EPC’s guarantee of equal employment
opportunity regardless of gender will not be fully realized for women—or for
men who assume roles that are stereotypically those of women.
2. Equal Protection Claim Based on Caregiver Status as a Proxy for Gender
To establish a claim for gender discrimination in violation of the EPC, a
plaintiff must prove that she suffered purposeful or intentional discrimination on
the basis of gender.161 Discrimination based on gender, once proven, is only
153. Family Medical Leave Act of 1993, 29 U.S.C.A. § 2601(a)(3), (5) (2006).
154. Id. at § 2601(a)(3).
155. See supra Section II.
156. See Parker v. Delaware Dep’t of Pub. Safety, 11 F. Supp. 2d 467, 471 (D. Del. 1998) (relating
that the plaintiff, who requested not to be given rotating shifts because she could not coordinate
daycare, was placed on rotating shifts as punishment for complaints she made about sex
discrimination).
157. See Lust v. Sealy, Inc., 383 F.3d 580, 583 (7th Cir. 2004) (imparting that a female sales
representative was passed over for a promotion because she had children and her supervisor did not
think that she would want to relocate).
158. See Bailey v. Scott-Gallaher, Inc., 480 S.E.2d. 502, 503 (Va. 1997) (finding that working mother
was terminated after giving birth because her employer considered her unreliable as a result of
having a newborn).
159. Nev. Dep’t of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 738 (2003).
160. Id. at 734.
161. Back v. Hastings on Hudson Union Free Sch. Dist., 365 F.3d 107,118 (2d Cir. 2004) (citing Vill.
of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 264–65 (1977)).
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permissible if the state provides an “exceedingly persuasive” justification for the
rule or practice (i.e., that the classification serves “important government
objectives and that the discriminatory means employed are substantially related
to the achievement of those objectives”).162 Two EPC analytical frameworks
might be used to establish a violation of a right to equal employment
opportunity when an employer strictly adheres to workplace norms that
maintain family-wage barriers or takes other adverse employment action against
caregivers. The first is a claim for employment discrimination in violation of the
EPC. The second is a direct challenge to a state policy that maintains familywage barriers.
a. A Theory of Employment Discrimination Based on Caregiver
Status
One way to challenge the sex discrimination that results from family-wage
barriers is through a claim of employment discrimination in violation of the
EPC.163
In the absence of direct evidence of intent, EPC employment
discrimination claims are analyzed under the McDonnell Douglas three-prong
burden-shifting framework.164 However, courts and scholars have criticized the
McDonnell Douglas framework as overly cumbersome and “actually invit[ing]
juries and courts to lose sight of the ultimate issue in an employment
discrimination case.”165 This framework encourages a piecemeal approach to
assessing evidence and prevents a fact finder from considering everything before
deciding whether it is more likely than not that the employer was motivated, at
least in part, by a discriminatory animus.166
The inadequacies of McDonnell Douglas, and the way in which it limits full
and fair protection of the rights guaranteed by the EPC, are apparent in a

162. United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 513, 533 (1996) (internal quotations and citations omitted).
163. This article focuses on fundamental rights violations of caregivers due to discriminatory
work structures based on the family-wage ideal. Title VII may be an additional source for a cause of
action based on the failure to accommodate caregiving responsibilities. However, without evidence
that a similarly situated male employee was granted a caregiving accommodation, courts have been
reluctant to entertain such claims. See, e.g., Fralin v. C & D Sec., Inc., No. 06-2421, 2007 WL 1576464, at
*6–8 (E.D. Pa. May 30, 2007) (stating that Title VII does not protect against discrimination based on
“child rearing” because child rearing is a gender neutral trait); Fejes v. Gilpin Ventures, Inc., 960 F.
Supp. 1487, 1492 (D. Colo. 1997). See also Albiston, supra note 28, at 1154–55 (agreeing that Title VII
offers limited protection for those who need accommodations).
164. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802–04 (1973). The first prong of McDonnell
Douglas requires the plaintiff to set forth a prima facie case by establishing (a) she belongs to a
protected class, (b) she is qualified for the position that she held, (c) she suffered an adverse
employment action, and (d) the adverse employment action gives rise to an inference of
discrimination. If a plaintiff sets forth the prima facie case, a presumption of intentional
discrimination arises. Id. at 802. Under the second prong of McDonnell Douglas, the defendant must
articulate a legitimate non-discriminatory reason for the action. Tex. Dep’t of Cmty. Affairs v.
Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 254 (1981). Under the final prong of McDonnell Douglas, the plaintiff must
establish that the defendant’s proffered reason is a pretext for discrimination. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 253.
165. Denny Chin & Jodi Golinsky, Moving Beyond McDonnell Douglas: A Simplified Method for
Assessing Evidence in Discrimination Cases, 64 BROOK. L. REV. 659, 671 (1998) (internal quotations and
citations omitted).
166. Id. at 675 n.82.
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challenge to an adverse employment action based on caregiver status.167
Although such a case presents an issue of sex equality that denies women—at
least those who conform to the stereotype of the group—employment
opportunities equal to men, the rigidity of McDonnell Douglas makes it difficult
for a plaintiff to meet even the first two elements of a prima facie case. A prima
facie McDonnell Douglas case requires the plaintiff to establish that she is in a
protected class.168 In these cases, a court might characterize the plaintiff’s class as
a caregiver, rather than as a woman, despite the fact that caregivers are,
statistically, a subset of women.169 “Caregiver” has not been identified as a
protected class.170 Nor should it need to be for a claim based on caregiver status;
the already-recognized protected class of sex should be sufficient to satisfy this
prong.171
The second element of the McDonnell Douglas prima facie case is also an
obstacle in fully and fairly adjudicating claims based on family-wage barriers.
The second element of the McDonnell Douglas prima facie case is whether the
plaintiff is qualified for the job. Courts have been persuaded by the argument
that a plaintiff is not qualified for the job if she cannot conform to the workplace
structure (developed around a male breadwinner-female caregiver ideal).172 By
imposing such a requirement, courts hold plaintiffs to the very standards they
allege are discriminatory. Ultimately, the McDonnell Douglas framework allows
legitimate violations of women’s rights to equal employment opportunity to
persist.
When the Court first announced the analytical framework in McDonnell
Douglas, it acknowledged that the framework might need modification to
accommodate different employment discrimination contexts.173 Without losing
sight of the plaintiff’s ultimate burden in an employment discrimination case,
and using McDonnell Douglas as a guideline and starting point,174 this article
167. Walsh v. Nat’l Computer Sys., 332 F.3d 1150, 1159–61 (8th Cir. 2003).
168. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 254.
169. Chadwick v. WellPoint, Inc., 561 F.3d 38, 46 (1st Cir. 2009).
170. Walsh, 332 F.3d at 1160.
171. Id. (finding that the discrimination was based on pregnancy and that the plaintiff’s ability to
become pregnant, as a woman, was sufficient to support a claim of gender discrimination).
172. Pregnancy discrimination cases, in particular, have been unsuccessful for this reason. See
Joanna L. Grossman & Gillian L. Thomas, Making Pregnancy Work: Overcoming the Pregnancy
Discrimination Act’s Capacity-Based Model, 21 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 15, 34–35 (2009); see also Lacoparra
v. Pergament Home Ctrs., 982 F. Supp. 213, 227 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (attempting to characterize pregnancy
as a disability warranting discrimination protection). Within the male breadwinner-female caregiver
norm, the court inquired: “the question is whether the [pregnancy] complication itself (i.e., the
‘impairment,’ or physiological disorder) is substantial enough to qualify as a ‘disability . . . .’” Id.
173. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 n.13 (1973). See also Furnco Constr.
Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 577 (1978) (stating that the McDonnell Douglas standard was “never
intended to be rigid, mechanized, or ritualistic”). Furthermore, some courts of appeals interpreted the
Supreme Court’s decision in Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90, 100–102 (2003) as modifying the
final prong of the McDonnell Douglas analysis, even though the Court did not expressly state so. See
White v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 533 F.3d 381, 398–402 (6th Cir. 2008) (discussing the various ways
in which circuit courts have interpreted Desert Palace’s effect on the McDonnell Douglas framework).
174. Indeed, the Court has recognized that “[t]he importance of McDonnell Douglas lies, not in its
specification of the discrete elements of proof there required, but in its recognition of the general
principle that any [] plaintiff must carry the initial burden of offering evidence adequate to create an
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proposes a modified framework for analyzing a claim for discrimination based
on caregiver status. This proposal draws from the framework that courts use to
analyze claims for a failure to accommodate disabilities under the Americans
with Disabilities Act (“ADA”).175 Under the proposed framework, the plaintiff
would have to show that (1) she has caregiving responsibilities, (2) she suffered
an adverse employment action because of her caregiving responsibilities, and (3)
she is able to perform the essential functions of the job, with or without a
reasonable alternative work arrangement (“AWA”).176 A defendant would then
have the opportunity to show that all alternatives were unduly burdensome (if
relevant), the reason for the adverse action was not based on plaintiff’s caregiver
status and not negated by an AWA, or an inference of sex discrimination from
action based on caregiving responsibilities is absent.177
This proposed framework alleviates two obstacles imposed by the
McDonnell Douglas framework that prevent a court from substantively
addressing the EPC violations resulting from family-wage barriers. First, this
framework presumes that adverse actions against people with caregiving
responsibilities constitute actions based on sex. Statistically and socially, as
recognized by the Supreme Court in Hibbs and supported by the statistics cited
above,178 caregivers are a subset of women.179 This caregiver subset, as discussed
by Joan C. Williams and Nancy Segal, is more susceptible and vulnerable to sex
role stereotypes and more likely to be discriminated against than women
generally.180 Therefore, adverse actions based on caregiver status should be
considered presumptively based on gender for purposes of addressing these
claims. A presumption that caregiver status discrimination is discrimination
based on gender avoids protracted litigation about whether the plaintiff is a
member of a protected class and the necessity for courts to determine what level
of scrutiny a new class would receive. Nevertheless, under the framework, the
presumption is rebuttable; the burden is on the party with the best access to
statistics and data showing that patterns in a particular place of employment are

inference that an employment decision was based on a discriminatory criterion . . . .” Int’l. Bhd. of
Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 358 (1977). Courts have been amenable to departing from the
strict “mixed motive” or McDonnell Douglas framework. See Chadwick, 561 F.3d at 45–46.
175. Americans with Disabilities Act, 29 C.F.R. § 1630 (1991).
176. This proposed framework incorporates several elements of the McDonnell Douglas prima
facie case: that the plaintiff is in a protected class, she suffered an adverse action, and is qualified for
the position. Borrowing from the reasonable disability accommodations context, this framework
defines “qualified” with reference to an AWA. See, e.g., Calero-Cerezo v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 355
F.3d 6, 20 (1st Cir. 2004) (requiring a plaintiff alleging an ADA claim for failure to accommodate to
show (1) she was or is disabled, (2) the defendant is aware of the disability, and (3) she satisfies the
prerequisites of the position and can perform the essential functions of the job either with or without
a reasonable accommodation).
177. Mindful of the fact that the Supreme Court would be reluctant to depart from the McDonnell
Douglas framework, this proposed framework is a compromise meant to efficiently address the
ultimate issues relevant to this claim, not an ideal framework for plaintiffs in employment
discrimination claims.
178. See supra Section II.
179. To the extent that male caregivers might pursue these claims, the adverse action is also based
on sex because it is based on the male assuming the stereotypical role of a woman.
180. Williams & Segal, supra note 71, at 80.
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inconsistent with the broader social reality.181
Placing this burden on the defendant dilutes the importance of a
comparator to the plaintiff’s case.182 Courts sometimes rely too heavily on
comparator evidence, the absence of which creates a negative inference for the
plaintiff.183 Relying on a comparator in the context of a caregiver case ignores
the reality that male caregivers are rare. If a male caregiver comparator is
present and treated similarly as the plaintiff, relying on the comparator ignores
the likely possibility that the negative treatment was due to the male caregiver
not conforming to sex role stereotypes, and, therefore, based on sex and
actionable under a sex-stereotyping theory.184
Additionally, the proposed framework eliminates a second fundamental
problem of McDonnell Douglas, which defines whether a woman is qualified
based on her ability to conform to an inherently discriminatory work structure.185
Instead, this framework mirrors ADA accommodations jurisprudence by
allowing the caregiver to demonstrate that she is qualified for the position if an
AWA is made.186 A defendant, in turn, cannot simply say that the plaintiff was
unqualified for the position because of her inability to conform to the workplace
structure.
b. Application of the Modified Framework
Satisfying the first element of the plaintiff’s case should be relatively easy
for the plaintiff to accomplish; she need only demonstrate that she has caregiving
responsibilities.187 Nevertheless, this first element is a necessary component of
an EPC gender discrimination claim because it links the challenged action to the
basis of a protected class: sex.188 To argue that caregivers are a subset of women,
advocates should rely on Hibbs and statistics establishing that caregivers are a

181. See Back v. Hastings on Hudson Union Free Sch. Dist., 365 F.3d 107, 118–22 (2d Cir. 2004).
182. See id. (stating that stereotyping about the qualities of mothers is a form of sex discrimination
and can be determined without reference to father comparators); Tingley-Kelley v. Trustees of Univ.
of Pa., 677 F. Supp. 2d 764, 778 (E.D. Pa. 2010) (holding that no comparator is necessary to determine
whether a woman was discriminated against based on her caregiver status, stating “the ultimate
issue in any discrimination case is whether the plaintiff, as an individual, is discriminated against” and
recognizing the difficulty that a plaintiff might have in obtaining evidence of how similarly situated
men were treated).
183. For a brief discussion on problems with the comparator analysis, see Grossman & Thomas,
supra note 172, at 34–35. In any event, the proper comparison would be men and single women
without caregiving responsibilities. Men are not presumed to have caregiving responsibilities that
might interfere with their jobs. Single women without caregiving responsibilities are viewed by
employers to be like the ideal male breadwinner and are treated better than women with caregiving
responsibilities.
184. Bass v. Chem. Banking Corp., No. 94 Civ. 8833, 1996 WL 374151, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. July 2, 1996)
(inferring no evidence of discrimination based on the lack of evidence that married men or men with
children were treated differently).
185. See Williams & Segal, supra note 71, at 93–94 (discussing the ways in which women and
caregivers have difficulty conforming to the male-designed workplace).
186. Calero-Cerezo v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 355 F.3d 6, 23 (1st Cir. 2004).
187. See id. (stating that, in order for a plaintiff to bring an ADA claim, an individual must prove
he or she is disabled).
188. Tingley-Kelley v. Trustees of Univ. of Pa., 677 F. Supp. 2d 764, 778 (E.D. Pa. 2010)
(recognizing that stereotypes based on mothers are linked to the protected gender class).
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subset of women. As discussed above, in upholding the FMLA as a proper
exercise of Congress’ power to remedy gender discrimination, the Court
acknowledged that because women are society’s primary caregivers,
discrimination against caregivers disproportionately affects women.189 Hibbs laid
a foundation for courts to recognize that discrimination based on caregiver status
is discrimination based on gender.
The second prong that a plaintiff would have to demonstrate under the
proposed framework is the existence of an adverse employment action. An
adverse employment action produces a “material employment disadvantage.”190
“Termination, cuts in pay or benefits, and changes that affect an employee’s
future career prospects are significant enough to meet the standard . . . as would
circumstances amounting to a constructive discharge.”191 The creation of a
hostile environment might also constitute or result in an adverse action and is an
actionable claim.192
Consider Shireen Walsh, a “top performer” in her job as a customer service
account representative who prevailed on her constructive discharge, hostile
environment, and retaliation claims against her employer.193 After returning
from maternity leave following the birth of her son, Walsh immediately
experienced hostility from her supervisor.194 The Eighth Circuit’s summary of
the facts developed in the district court evidence disparate treatment and
harassment based on caregiver status. An example of disparate treatment
included an instance when, “as a reward for having covered Walsh’s workload
while she was on leave,” Walsh’s coworkers got the afternoon off, “but Walsh
was told to stay in the office and watch the phones.”195 Additionally, the Eighth
Circuit noted that “[w]hen Walsh asked if she could change her schedule to leave
work at 4:30 p.m. instead of 5:00 because her son’s daycare closed at 5:00,
[Walsh’s boss] told Walsh that her territory needed coverage until 5:00 and that
‘maybe she should look for another job.’’’196
This contrasted with treatment of “[o]ther account representatives [who] left
work at 3:45 on a regular basis.”197 Further, Walsh’s boss “testified at trial that
Walsh’s territory did not need to be covered through 5:00.”198 Additionally,
Walsh had to “make up ‘every minute’ that she spent away from the office for
doctors appointments for herself or her son and time spent caring for her son.
No other employee was required to make up work for time missed due to

189. See Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA) of 1993, 29 U.S.C. § 2601 (2006) (acknowledging
that caretaking responsibilities often fall to women, impacting the lives of working women more than
the lives of working men).
190. Cross v. Cleaver, 142 F.3d 1059, 1073 (8th Cir. 1998) (internal quotations and citations
omitted).
191. Kerns v. Capital Graphics, Inc., 178 F.3d 1011, 1016 (8th Cir. 1999).
192. Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 66–67 (1986).
193. Walsh v. Nat’l Computer Sys., 332 F.3d 1150, 1159–61 (8th Cir. 2003).
194. Id. at 1154.
195. Id. at 1155.
196. Id.
197. Id.
198. Id.
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appointments and other personal matters.”199
The Eighth Circuit’s summary also included examples of harassment based
on caregiver status: “[w]hen Walsh was showing co-workers pictures of her son
on her first day back to work, [Walsh’s boss] told her to stop disrupting the office
and to get back to work.”200 Walsh’s boss also “attached signs (‘Out—Sick
Child’) to Walsh’s cubicle when Walsh had to care for her son.”201 The Eighth
Circuit noted that “notes typically were not placed on other absent employees’
cubicles.”202 Further examples of harassment included the boss’s reference “to
Walsh’s son as ‘the sickling’’’ and her demand that Walsh “find a pediatrician
who was open after hours” after “thr[owing] a phone book on Walsh’s desk.”203
And “[w]hen Walsh told [her boss] she needed to pick her son up from daycare
because he was ill, [her boss] replied, ‘Is this an April Fool’s joke? If so, it’s not at
all funny.’”204 As a result of the stress, Walsh fainted at work and was brought to
the hospital. “The next day, [Walsh’s boss] stopped at Walsh’s cubicle and told
her, ‘you better not be pregnant again.’’’205 Walsh attempted to find a solution
for the tension between her and the supervisor, but eventually quit her job.206
The defendant’s motion for partial summary judgment was denied,
demonstrating that the district court believed that the facts, if viewed in favor of
the plaintiff, could support liability based on several theories.207 Ultimately, the
jury found in favor of Walsh on the charges of constructive discharge, retaliation,
pregnancy discrimination, and hostile environment.208 On appeal to the Eighth
Circuit, the jury’s verdict was affirmed based on the evidence supporting
pregnancy discrimination on a hostile environment theory. The circuit court
held that Walsh’s potential to become pregnant meant that she fell within the
protection afforded by the statute.209 The circuit did not address whether the
evidence supported a cause of action based on Walsh’s status as a caregiver. By
avoiding the discrimination against Walsh that was based on her caregiver
status, the precedent falls short of establishing that discrimination against
caregivers is discrimination against women in violation of federal statute, despite
the circuit’s opportunity to acknowledge such.
Although the Eighth Circuit ultimately avoided the issue of whether
Walsh’s caregiver status could support liability under Title VII, Walsh’s case
demonstrates the several types of adverse actions that women with caregiving
responsibilities might be subjected to, including hostile environment and
constructive discharge. The examples of discrimination discussed in Section
IV(B), such as Joann Trezza,210 who was passed over for a promotion, or Patricia
199.
200.
201.
202.
203.
204.
205.
206.
207.
208.
209.
210.

Id.
Id. at 1154–55.
Id. at 1155.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1154–55.
Id. at 1155–56.
Id. at 1156.
See id. at 1158–61.
Id. at 1160.
Trezza v. Hartford, Inc., No. 98 CIV. 2205, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20206, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Dec.
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Leahy, who was terminated, highlight additional adverse actions that employers
might take based on a woman’s status as caregiver.211
In addition, a plaintiff like Walsh who requests and is denied a reasonable
AWA might suffer an adverse employment action on that basis alone. If a
plaintiff can establish the first and third elements of the proposed framework—
that she has caregiving responsibilities and is qualified for the job, with or
without an AWA—she might pursue a claim based on the employer’s failure to
give an AWA for caregiving responsibilities. An AWA is a change in the work
structure that would allow a caregiver to do her job without sacrificing her
responsibilities as worker or caregiver.212 An employer’s failure to grant an
AWA for caregiving responsibilities can cause a “material employment
disadvantage,”213 constituting an adverse employment action. 214 It can mean
that a woman is excluded altogether from employment or forced to forgo
advancement opportunities.215
Recognizing a claim based on the failure to give an AWA would not require
the court to recognize an entirely new adverse employment action.216 Adverse
actions based on a failure to make reasonable accommodations in the disability
and religious discrimination contexts are firmly recognized by precedent.217 In
those contexts, statutes—the ADA and Title VII—make it an unlawful
employment practice for an employer not to make reasonable accommodations,
short of undue hardship, for the disabilities or religious practices of its
employees.218 In creating a cause of action based on the failure to accommodate,
Congress implicitly recognized a need to change the work structure to fully
realize the guarantees of the EPC to be free from discrimination on the basis of
disability or religion.219 At least one court has held, in the context of the
Rehabilitation Act, that childcare leave is a potential accommodation because it

30, 1998).
211. Leahy v. Gap, Inc., No. 07-2008, 2008 WL 2946007, at *5 (E.D.N.Y. July 29, 2008).
212. See Calero-Cerezo v. U.S. Dep’t. of Justice, 355 F.3d 6, 20 (1st Cir. 2004) (stating that, under
the ADA, employers are required to make “reasonable accommodations to disabled employees”).
213. Cross v. Cleaver, 142 F.3d 1059, 1073 (8th Cir. 1998).
214. See id. at 1073 (stating that employers would be liable for retaliatory actions characterized as
“material employment disadvantages”).
215. See, e.g., Leahy, 2008 WL 2946007, at *5; Trezza, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20206, at* 4.
216. See Calero-Cerezo, 355 F.3d 6 at 20.
217. See id.; Heller v. EBB Auto Co., 8 F.3d 1433, 1438 (9th Cir. 1993).
218. Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C.A. § 12112(5) (1990) (defining discrimination as
“not making reasonable accommodations” in the absence of undue hardship); Title VII, 42 U.S.C.A.
2000e(j) (1991) (making it unlawful to discriminate on the basis of religion and defining religion to
include “all aspects of religious observance and practice, as well as belief, unless an employer
demonstrates that he is unable to reasonably accommodate” a religious observance “without undue
hardship”); Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63, 72 (1977) (opining that the intent and
effect of the definition of “religion” was to make it an unlawful employment practice for an employer
not to make reasonable accommodation, short of undue hardship).
219. But see Holmes v. Marion Co. Office of Family & Children, 349 F.3d 914, 921–922 (7th Cir.
2003) (holding that the defendant was entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity because the
religious accommodations provision of Title VII was enacted pursuant to Congress’ power under the
Commerce Clause, not the EPC, and, thus cannot be used to compel a state to accommodate religious
practices).
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permits the plaintiff to lead a normal life.220 Greater protections are afforded for
sex than for disability,221 so courts should be receptive to the argument that a
failure to give an AWA constitutes an adverse employment action in the gender
discrimination context.
Although courts should be reminded that greater constitutional protections
are afforded to women than people with disabilities, reference to the ADA
framework might make a court more apt to recognize a claim based on a failure
to grant an AWA. If the court refers to the ADA accommodation analysis, the
plaintiff’s request for a proposed reasonable alternative would trigger an
employer’s duty to provide an AWA, and the plaintiff would have to show that
she requested an AWA to establish an adverse employment action.222 If a
plaintiff would be able to perform her job with an AWA and does not receive
one, an employer who does not engage in an interactive process to provide an
AWA should be held liable for failing to engage in the interactive process, as well
as the failure to provide an AWA.223
ADA jurisprudence provides guidance on what types of accommodations
are reasonable in the employment context.224 Under the ADA, “[t]he employer
must be willing to consider making changes in its ordinary work rules, facilities,
terms, and conditions in order to enable a disabled individual to work.”225
Reasonable accommodations may include “job restructuring, part-time or
modified work schedules, reassignment to a vacant position . . . and other similar
accommodations.”226

220. McWright v. Alexander, 982 F.2d 222, 227 (7th Cir. 1992).
221. Nev. Dept. of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 735–36 (2003) (applying rational basis
review to disability discrimination).
222. See Freadman v. Metro. Prop. and Cas. Ins. Co., 484 F.3d 91, 102–103 (1st Cir. 2007) (holding
that plaintiff’s ADA claim failed in part because the duty to accommodate was not triggered); CaleroCerezo, 355 F.3d 6 at 24 (denying summary judgment to defendant on plaintiff’s ADA claim because
the plaintiff requested an accommodation and triggered the duty to accommodate).
223. 29 C.F.R. 1630.2(o)(3) (2011); Lovejoy-Wilson v. NOCO Motor Fuel, Inc., 263 F.3d 208, 218–19
(2d Cir. 2001); Taylor v. Phoenixville Sch. Dist., 174 F.3d 142, 157 (3d Cir. 1999).
224. Precedent interpreting the ADA obligation to accommodate is more amenable to plaintiffs’
positions than precedent interpreting the Title VII’s obligation to accommodate religious practice,
and is more firmly rooted in the EPC. In a Title VII religious accommodations case, the employee
must establish a prima facie case by proving that (1) she has a bona fide religious belief, the practice
of which conflicted with an employment duty, (2) she informed the employer of the belief and
conflict, and (3) the employer threatened her with or subjected her to discriminatory treatment,
including discharge, because of her inability to fulfill the job requirements. Heller v. EBB Auto Co., 8
F.3d 1433, 1438 (9th Cir. 1993). Although an employer has an obligation to make a good faith effort to
accommodate a religious practice, any reasonable accommodation fulfills this obligation. Ansonia Bd.
Educ. v. Philbrook, 479 U.S. 60, 68 (1986). Furthermore, undue hardship to the employer results when
the religious practices accommodation results in “more than a de minimus cost” to the employer.
Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63, 84 (1977). See also Johnson v. Siemens Bldg.
Technologies, No. 05 C. 3836, 2007 WL. 1017850, at *19–20 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 20, 2007) (analyzing a failure
to accommodate caregiving responsibilities using the ADA’s framework).
225. Vande Zande v. State of Wis. Dep’t of Admin., 44 F.3d 538, 542 (7th Cir. 1995).
226. Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C.A. § 12111(9)(B) (1990); Colwell v. Rite Aid Corp.,
602 F.3d 495, 505–06 (3d Cir. 2010) (holding that changing an employee’s shift from nighttime to
daytime because the employee could not commute to work at night due to blindness in one eye was a
reasonable accommodation); Langon v. Dep’t of Health and Human Servs., 959 F.2d 1053, 1060–61
(D.C. Cir. 1992) (holding that working from home is a reasonable accommodation under the
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Although the analysis is fact-intensive, in light of the accommodations
deemed “reasonable” in ADA cases, the statistics and stories discussed
throughout this article make it easy to imagine the AWAs that a caregiver can
request.227 Alternatives to work structures might include any of the following:
1) a set work schedule for an hourly employee who must plan child care in
advance, 2) a shifted schedule that allows for the caregiver to either come in to
work later or leave earlier while still working a full day, 3) a part-time schedule,
or 4) allowance to work from home a few days per week. Workers might also
have the option to take time off for emergency caregiving needs, with the
promise to make up this time later. Fully realizing the EPC right to be free from
gender discrimination in the workplace requires changes to the work structure.
Without the court’s recognition of an EPC claim based solely on the failure to
grant AWAs, employment discrimination against women in its most subtle
forms will persist.
An employee might also have a claim for constructive discharge if she quit
her job, like Shireen Walsh did, as a result of the type of adverse actions just
described.228 Constructive discharge is another type of an adverse employment
action.229 “[T]he purpose of the constructive discharge doctrine [is] to protect
employees from conditions so unreasonably harsh that a reasonable person
would feel compelled to leave the job.”230 This doctrine remedies a situation in
which “an employer . . . subjectively desires an employee to remain, so long as
the employee is willing to accept unreasonable, oppressive conditions.”231 To
establish a constructive discharge claim, a plaintiff must demonstrate that a
reasonable person would have found the conditions of employment
intolerable.232 An employee who “quits without giving [her] employer a
reasonable chance to work out a problem” is not constructively discharged.233 A
minority of circuit courts also require that the employer intended to force the
employee to resign.234
Rehabilitation Act).
227. See Sections II, IV.
228. See Walsh v. Nat’l Computer Sys., 332 F.3d 1150, 1156 (8th Cir. 2003).
229. Pa. State Police v. Suders, 542 U.S. 129, 148 (2004).
230. Ramos v. Davis & Geck, Inc., 167 F.3d 727, 732 (1st Cir. 1999).
231. Id.
232. Poland v. Chertoff, 494 F.3d 1174, 1184 (9th Cir. 2007) (quoting Brooks v. City of San Mateo,
229 F.3d 917, 930 (9th Cir. 2000)); Davis & Geck, Inc., 167 F.3d at 732, n.4 (citing cases indicating that
the Third, Fifth, Seventh, Eighth, Tenth and D.C. Circuits do not require proof of an employer’s
subjective intent; the Second and Fourth Circuits require proof of employer intent); but see Sanchez v.
Denver Pub. Sch., 164 F.3d 527, 534 (10th Cir. 1998); Gartman v. Gencorp Inc., 120 F.3d 127, 130 (8th
Cir. 1997) (requiring an employee to show employer’s intent to force employee to quit);
Konstantopoulos v. Westvaco Corp., 112 F.3d 710, 718 (3d Cir. 1997) (applying an objective standard);
Derr v. Gulf Oil Corp, 796 F.2d 340, 344 (10th Cir. 1986) (stating that “proof of constructive discharge
depends upon whether a reasonable [person] would view the working conditions as intolerable”)
(internal quotations omitted).
233. Brenneman v. Famous Dave’s of America, Inc., 507 F.3d 1139, 1144 (8th Cir. 2007) .
234. See Trierweiler v. Wells Fargo Bank, 639 F.3d 456, 459–61 (8th Cir. 2011) (affirming a grant of
summary judgment for defendant where plaintiff, who alleged pregnancy discrimination on the basis
of a constructive discharge, failed to meet the “substantial burden” to show that the conditions were
intolerable or that the employer intended to force her to quit); Chertkova v. Conn. Gen. Life Ins. Co.,
92 F.3d 81, 89 (2d Cir. 1996); Bristow v. Daily Press, Inc., 770 F.2d 1251, 1255 (4th Cir. 1985).
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A variety of employment actions might give rise to a constructive discharge
claim; the inquiry is case-specific.235 One court held that a jury could conclude
that a change in cubicle location, work title, duties, and a requirement to work on
vacation time were factors that could make a workplace intolerable to a
reasonable person.236 Similarly, reassignment from a lucrative sales territory
with the option to accept reassignment or resign is considered a constructive
discharge.237 At least two circuits recognize that a complete failure to
accommodate a disability, in the face of repeated requests, evidences the
deliberateness necessary for a constructive discharge.238
Because sex
discrimination triggers greater constitutional protection than disability
discrimination,239 a similar holding should be reached in the context of a woman
who quits her job because of an employer’s failure to grant an AWA, or a hostile
environment based on caregiver status.
The adverse actions described above make working conditions intolerable.
For example, the harassment and disparate treatment endured by Shireen Walsh
forced her to leave her job.240 The lack of an AWA for Devorah Gartner,
described below, required her to quit.241 For these women, the treatment is akin
to a mandatory discharge policy.242 Poor women are punished because they are
threatened with destitution; an inability to fit caregiving responsibilities into the
family-wage work structure can mean that they are forced to quit their jobs, or
work insufficient hours to support themselves and their families. Wealthier
women, who might not need to work in order to support their families, are
adversely affected because this treatment reinforces societal pressure to
relinquish career aspirations.
The final element that a plaintiff must demonstrate to meet her burden of
production under the proposed framework is that she is qualified for the
position, with an AWA if she needs one, or without an AWA if she does not.243
235. Carter v. Town of Benton, 827 F.2d 700, 705 (W.D. La. 2010) (denying defendant’s motion for
summary judgment on plaintiff’s parallel Title VII and Section 1983 claims, which alleged that she
was constructively discharged when given the option to quit or be fired after complaining about
sexual harassment).
236. Davis & Geck, Inc., 167 F.3d at 731–32.
237. Goss v. Exxon Office Sys., Co., 747 F.2d 885, 888–89 (3d Cir. 1984).
238. Compare Crabhill v. Charlotte Mecklenburg Bd. Of Educ., 423 Fed. Appx. 314, 324 (4th Cir.
2011), with Trierweiler, 639 F.3d at 460 (leaving open the possibility that a failure to accommodate
could suffice as evidence of constructive discharge, but holding that evidence of an intent to provide
an accommodation undermined a constructive discharge claim where the plaintiff needs to prove
employer’s intent to force her to quit), and Talley v. Family Dollar Stores of Ohio, Inc., 542 F.3d 1099,
1109 (6th Cir. 2008) (joining the Fourth Circuit in recognizing that a jury may conclude that an
employee’s resignation was both intended and foreseeable when an employee makes a repeated
request for an accommodation and that request is denied and no reasonable alternative is offered).
239. Compare Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 247 (1995) (iterating that courts
review cases of gender discrimination using an “intermediate scrutiny” standard), with Bd. of Trs. of
Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 366 (2001) (applying a rational basis standard of review to
allegations of constitutional violations on the basis of disability).
240. Walsh v. Nat’l Computer Sys., 332 F.3d 1150, 1156 (8th Cir. 2003).
241. LERNER, supra note 9, at 13.
242. See Ramos v. Davis & Geck, Inc., 167 F.3d 727, 732 (1st Cir. 1999).
243. See Calero-Cerezo v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 355 F.3d 6, 22 (1st Cir. 2004) (describing the
plaintiff’s requirement to show she is qualified for the position in question).
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Unlike the traditional McDonnell Douglas framework, by defining whether a
woman is qualified with reference to how she can perform the job if given a
needed AWA, the proposed framework allows a plaintiff to demonstrate that she
meets essential job functions without reference to an inherently discriminatory
workplace structure. A defendant cannot defeat this claim by arguing that an
employee is not qualified for a job because of her inability to meet job
requirements that would not exist if she was granted an AWA. Under this
analysis, conditions such as an employee’s inability to put in “face time” at the
office, the need for a set weekly schedule, or the need for an emergency leave
allowance will not generally be considered to undermine “essential job
functions.”244 Plaintiffs should focus on the specific job functions and duties to
argue that the employee can meet those requirements, even with minor
modifications to the traditional work structure of the place of employment.
Plaintiffs can argue, as highlighted above, that defining whether a woman is
“qualified” by referring to her ability to meet the essential jobs functions, rather
than whether she can conform to an outdated work structure, is more consistent
with EPC jurisprudence that seeks to eliminate sex-role stereotypes.245
Under this proposed framework, the defendant would have the opportunity
to demonstrate one of three defenses to defeat the plaintiff’s claim: 1) the
employee was not qualified, even with an AWA, or no reasonable AWA existed;
2) the adverse action was not based on caregiver status; or 3) the inference of
discrimination is absent.246 The first of these defenses borrows directly from
analysis of the reasonableness of an ADA accommodation, in which the
employer must show that any accommodation for a disability imposes an undue
hardship.247 An accommodation that creates only “some difficulty” for an
employer does not impose an undue burden.248 Under the ADA, an employer is
not required to create a new position for the plaintiff or reallocate essential job
functions,249 but advocates might argue that the greater protection afforded to
sex classifications warrants types of AWAs not necessarily required by the ADA
to eliminate family-wage barriers. At most, only “some difficulty” results from

244. See id. at 23 (confirming that if an accommodation is reasonable and feasible an employer
should make the accommodation).
245. See Ginsburg, supra note 38, at 268–70 (arguing that defining whether an employee is
qualified with reference to an available AWA does not fully remedy the problems posed by a
discriminatory workplace, but it acknowledges that the work structure is itself discriminatory and
has been accepted by the courts as a way to analyze whether a plaintiff is qualified in the disability
context).
246. See Calero-Cerezo, 355 F.3d at 23.
247. Id.
248. See Freadman v. Metro. Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 484 F.3d 91, 103 (1st Cir. 2007) (holding that an
accommodation that creates only “some difficulty” for an employer does not impose an undue
burden); Heaser v. Toro Co., 247 F.3d 826, 832 (8th Cir. 2001) (affirming summary judgment in favor
of defendant, holding that the employer was not required to make an overall change in the way it
conducted business to accommodate plaintiff and finding that plaintiff could not perform the
essential functions of her job from home); Langon v. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 959 F.2d 1053,
1060 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (finding that an employer is not required to create a new position or reallocate
essential functions of a job).
249. Heaser, 247 F.3d at 832.
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restructuring work to accommodate caregiving responsibilities.250
An employer may also defeat a claim by showing that the adverse action
was not based on caregiver status; this is analogous to an employer’s
opportunity in any discrimination claim to demonstrate that the adverse action
was not based on the employee’s membership in a protected class.251 Here,
however, an employer cannot defeat a claim simply by highlighting another
basis for the adverse action if that basis is negated by the implementation of an
AWA.252 For example, if the employer claims that the adverse action occurred
because the woman leaves early, that justification would be insufficient if the
employee completed all assignments on time and leaving early does not harm
the employer. If the stated reason for termination is repeated tardiness to a
morning shift because a woman needs to drop her child off at school, and
moving the shift a half hour later is an alternative to the adverse action, an
employer cannot defeat the action by offering tardiness as a non-discriminatory
reason for the action. If, on the other hand, such an alternative was offered or
implemented and the woman was still late to her shift, tardiness constitutes a
non-discriminatory reason.
Finally, an employer can defeat a claim by challenging the presumption that
caregiver status is a proxy for gender.253 A defendant would most likely seek to
do so by comparing how the plaintiff was treated with how other employees
were treated. Statistics might also demonstrate that the defendant’s workplace
does not conform to average workplaces in regards to retention of women and
women who hold upper level positions. When making comparisons to defeat
the presumption of caregiver status as a proxy for gender, courts and advocates
should make comparisons between men and women workers that include the
retention rates, the reasons why women leave verses why men leave, the rates of
promotions, and the gender and caretaking status of those holding the higher
level positions to determine if there is a pattern at the particular workplace
consistent with the broader society. These comparisons should help account for
the state of equality between the genders at the place of employment in order to
undermine the presumption that the discrimination based on caregiver status
was based on gender. To that extent, the inquiry is more nuanced than a
comparator analysis. An employer should not be able to simply point to one
male caregiver who suffered an adverse action, when that male caregiver was an
anomaly. This is particularly true because the male caregiver might have been
discriminated against based on his non-conformance to sex-role stereotypes. If
so, the discrimination is still based on sex. Indeed, the proper comparison would
be a man or a woman with no caregiving responsibilities—workers who conform
to the ideal male breadwinner model.
250. See Freadman, 484 F.3d at 103.
251. See Bass v. Chem. Banking Corp., No. 94 Civ. 8833, 1996 WL 374151, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. July 2,
1996) (holding that the employer successfully showed that the plaintiff was not treated differently
than others in her class).
252. See generally, Calero-Cerezo v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 355 F.3d 6, 23 (1st Cir. 2004) (analyzing
whether a reasonable fact finder could conclude that the plaintiff was qualified for the position and
examining whether she could perform her essential job functions with or without an
accommodation).
253. See Bass, 1996 WL 374151, at *5 (denying that caregiver status is a proxy for gender).
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An employment discrimination claim for a violation of the EPC due to
adverse actions because of caregiving status would require the court to recognize
that caregiver status is presumptively a class based on gender.254 Since the
current analytical framework used for employment discrimination allows
violations of the EPC to go unchallenged,255 the court should adopt a new
framework that fully protects these rights. In some cases, the claim will require
the court to recognize that a failure to grant an AWA is an adverse employment
action. Nevertheless, this claim follows from rights guaranteed by the EPC,
which provides the constitutional foundation for Title VII, the FMLA, and the
ADA, including those statutes’ provisions for claims based on failures to
accommodate in the disability and religious contexts.
c. A Challenge to Irrational State Policy that Maintains Family-Wage
Barriers
A direct challenge to an irrational state policy or action that maintains
family-wage barriers might arise if a state has a policy not to offer AWAs to
people with caregiving responsibilities, or penalizes individuals for working
with an AWA. For example, the female police officers in Prater v. Detroit Police
Department alleged that they were forced to take sick leave while pregnant,
regardless of whether they could perform their job functions.256 The police
department determined promotions based in part on the use of sick leave; so the
mandatory sick leave for pregnancy detrimentally affected their career
advancement.257 A parallel policy that indirectly penalizes people who, for
example, use their sick days or telecommute, should be challenged as a violation
of the EPC, because these policies result in disparate treatment of the caregivers
who are most likely to take advantage of the policies.
Work assignment procedures also might disproportionately and negatively
impact caregivers. Consider Deanna Tipler, a correctional officer who was
reassigned to a work shift that caused her to spend less time with her children
and more money on childcare.258 The employer reassigned Tipler pursuant to a
procedure accounting for the numbers of men and women on each shift,
seniority, and employee preference.259 The court ultimately held that the
procedure did not violate Title VII or the EPC. The court noted that pursuant to
Eighth Circuit precedent, a policy of staffing female-only wards only with female
guards is reasonable. Based on that precedent, the circuit concluded that the
County’s shift reassignment policy was reasonable to adequately staff female
wards, even though the prison allowed male guards to cover for female guards
when they took breaks. Because Tipler “showed only that her reassignment
caused her some personal inconvenience and expense” and “[a]ny restriction on

254. Grossman & Thomas, supra note 172, at 34–35.
255. Although Title VII might allow some claims to succeed, the violations that go unchallenged
are where family-wage barriers prevent women from doing their jobs.
256. Prater v. Detroit Police Dep’t, No. 08-14339, 2009 WL 4576039 at *1 (E.D. Mich. Dec. 3, 2009).
257. CENTER FOR WORKLIFE LAW, FAMILY RESPONSIBILITY DISCRIMINATION: LITIGATION UPDATE
2010, 13–14.
258. Tipler v. Douglas Cnty., Neb., 483 F.3d 1023, 1024 (8th Cir. 2007).
259. Id.
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Tipler’s employment was minimal,” the court affirmed dismissal of the claim.260
As Tipler’s situation demonstrates, policies that do not account for caregiving
responsibilities of workers adversely affect women more than men. These
policies should be challenged as violations of the EPC.
The Supreme Court uses a two-prong analysis when determining whether a
facially neutral state policy violates the EPC’s guarantee to be free from gender
discrimination.261 The Court first determines if the policy is “neutral in the sense
that it is not gender based.”262 If the classification is not based on gender, the
second step is to determine whether the “adverse effect reflects invidious genderbased discrimination.”263 However, a state policy or action with adverse effects
is only unconstitutional under the EPC if the discriminatory impact can be traced
to a discriminatory purpose.264
Although a policy against offering AWAs for caregivers or penalizing those
who work under arrangements more likely to be used by caregivers might be
couched as inherently non-neutral because caregivers are a subset of women, it is
difficult to predict how a court might receive this argument.265 The Court
rejected a similar argument in Personnel Administrator of Massachusetts v. Feeney.266
Feeney involved a gender discrimination challenge to a state statute granting an
absolute lifetime preference to veterans.267 The Court concluded that the statute
was facially neutral because, although only two percent of women were veterans,
the statute’s preference for veterans disadvantaged male and female nonveterans
alike.268 Similarly, a policy against AWAs or a policy that penalizes employees
for using AWAs disfavors male and female caregivers equally.
Assuming that the Court will view such policies as facially neutral, a
plaintiff must establish discriminatory purpose or intent.269 Discriminatory
intent is the selection or pursuit of a course of action at least in part because of
the adverse effect on a particular group.270 The disproportionate impact on a
particular group can be a starting point towards the evidence demonstrating a
discriminatory intent.271 Additional evidence might be gleaned from the
historical background of an employment decision and the procedural or
260. Id. at 1027–28.
261. See Pers. Adm’r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 274 (1979) (explaining that if the policy is
not facially neutral, it is subject to intermediate scrutiny, and must be substantially related to an
important government interest and must not intentionally discriminate against women).
262. Id.
263. Id.
264. Id. at 272.
265. See, e.g., id. at 275 (explaining that although a law favoring veteran status primarily benefits
men, the nonveterans disadvantaged by the law are men and women so the law is not grounded in a
gender-based classification).
266. See id. (rejecting the argument that laws favoring primarily male veterans classify based on
gender).
267. Id. at 259.
268. Id. at 275.
269. Id. at 274.
270. Id. at 279.
271. See Pryor v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 288 F.3d 548, 563 (3d Cir. 2002) (stating that
analyzing a facially neutral policy for race discrimination begins with a study of the impact of the
policy on different racial groups).

Maxwell Paginated Proof (Do Not Delete)

12/13/2012 10:10 AM

LEVERAGING THE COURTS TO PROTECT WOMEN’S FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS

159

substantive departures from the employer’s normal practices.272 To bolster her
claim, a plaintiff might highlight the development of the family-wage ideal as a
response to the shift of productive activity from the home to workplaces outside
of the home, establishing that the nature of work has been socially constructed to
exclude people with caregiving responsibilities. Using the evidence provided in
this article and its references, a plaintiff could establish that the majority of
people with caregiving responsibilities are women. Furthermore, supervisors’ or
managers’ remarks based on stereotypes about working women and
motherhood could provide direct evidence of discriminatory intent. For
example, one plaintiff alleging an EPC violation for a discriminatory firing was
told that her job as a school administrator “was perhaps not the job or the school
district for her if she had ‘little ones,’ and that it was ‘not possible for [her] to be a
good mother and have this job.’”273 These types of comments might be present in
cases where a state policy causes adverse treatment of caregivers and should be
highlighted as evidence of discriminatory animus.
If a plaintiff can establish discriminatory intent, the state must show that the
practice serves important government objectives and is substantially related to
these objectives.274 Although the state might articulate an important objective,
such as efficiency or economic productivity, the fact that workplace structures
are primarily socially constructed275 undermines the substantial relation of
family-wage barriers to the government’s objective. Indeed, workplace structures
that are considered inherent to work are in fact arbitrary and have little if any
relation to the government’s objective in many cases. One example, mentioned
previously, is the requirement that Walsh work until five and her boss’s trial
admission that this was not actually necessary to do the job. As a result, the
state’s policy violates women’s equal protection right to equal employment
opportunity.
Challenges to facially neutral policies have succeeded in the context of
pregnancy discrimination, providing encouragement that claims on behalf of
caregivers are possible. A jury found that a police department’s facially neutral
policy of excluding from light-duty status any officer who suffered an off-the-job
injury, condition, or illness violated the Pregnancy Discrimination Act.276 The
plaintiffs succeeded on their disparate treatment and disparate impact theories of

272. Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 267–68 (1977).
273. Back v. Hastings on Hudson Union Free Sch. Dist., 365 F.3d 107, 115 (2d Cir. 2004); see also
Santiago-Ramos v. Centennial P.R. Wireless Corp., 217 F.3d 46, 57 (1st Cir. 2000) (holding that, in a
Title VII case, the fact that plaintiff’s boss specifically questioned whether plaintiff would be able to
manage her work and family responsibilities after she told him that she was planning on having a
second child and fired her shortly thereafter, constituted evidence of discriminatory animus);
Sheehan v. Donlen Corp., 173 F.3d 1039, 1044 (7th Cir. 1999) (holding that, in a Title VII case, the fact
that at the time plaintiff, who was known to be pregnant, was fired, her supervisor said that she
would be happier at home with her children, was direct evidence of discrimination).
274. If the policy is not facially neutral, is it subject to intermediate scrutiny: it must be
substantially related to an important government interest. See Pers. Adm’r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442
U.S. 256, 274 (1979).
275. See supra Section I.
276. Docket at 7–8, Lochren v. Cnty. of Suffolk, No. CV 01-03925 (E.D.N.Y. July 14, 2006), Doc.
156-2; see also Lochren v. Cnty. of Suffolk, No. CV 01-3925, 2008 WL 2039458, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. May 9,
2008).
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liability and, in addition to a damage award, the police department changed its
policy for pregnant women.277 Similar policies that place a disproportionate
burden on caregivers should be challenged as violations of equal protection.
Equal protection claims challenging adverse employment actions against
caregivers and irrational state policies that lead to adverse treatment of
caregivers is a natural trajectory of existing EPC jurisprudence, which established
that state regulations that maintain the traditional male breadwinner-female
caregiver model are unconstitutional.278 Overt regulations based on sex
stereotypes may be all but obsolete, but a work structure that maintains these
roles persists. Challenging actions taken because of an employee’s caregiver
status, failures to make AWAs for those with caregiving responsibilities, and
policies that maintain family-wage barriers or penalize caregivers, is the next
step in fully eradicating gender stereotypes and employment inequality. This
step acknowledges that women are primary caregivers. When faced with familywage barriers, evolving EPC jurisprudence to recognize claims of caregiver
discrimination keeps developments in law at pace with developments in society.
Furthermore, the EPC’s protection against gender discrimination in the
workplace maintains a meaning that is not merely duplicative of Title VII.279 The
rights guaranteed by the EPC are broader than those protected by Title VII.
Limiting the EPC by deferring to legislation disrupts the proper role of the Court
as the branch of government responsible for defining the scope of constitutional
rights.
B. Substantive Due Process Rights
Family-wage barriers also jeopardize rights guaranteed by the Substantive
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, underscoring the idea that
the issue of women’s workforce attachment has constitutional liberty
dimensions. The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment provides
that no state shall “deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law . . . .”280 Due process of law includes a substantive due process
right “that provides heightened protection against government interference with
certain fundamental rights and liberty interests.”281 One such liberty interest is
the fundamental right to privacy.282 The Court recognizes the right to privacy in
a variety of contexts, at least three of which are implicated in addressing family-

277. Docket at 7–8, Lochren v. Cnty. of Suffolk, No. CV 01-03925 (E.D.N.Y. July 14, 2006), Doc.
152.
278. See supra Section I.
279. Johnson v. Transp. Agency, Santa Clara, Cnty., 480 U.S. 616, 627 n.6 (1987) (rejecting the
notion that the obligation of a public employer under Title VII must be identical to its obligations
under the Constitution, stating “[t]he fact that a public employer must also satisfy the Constitution
does not negate the fact that the statutory prohibition with which that employer must consent was not
intended to extend as far as that of the Constitution”).
280. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. This section addresses one of two theories under which a plaintiff
can bring a substantive due process claim, the deprivation of a protected liberty or property interest
protected by the Fourteenth Amendment.
281. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65 (2000) (quotations omitted).
282. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152–53 (1973) (explaining that the right to individual privacy is
contained in a variety of clauses throughout the Constitution).
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wage barriers: the right to pursue a career of one’s choosing283 and the rights to
bear284 and rear one’s children.285 Women might forgo or delay having children
to pursue their career because of the state’s failure to offer AWAs or might be
forced out of the workplace after having children. Working mothers might also
be forced to choose between personally rearing their children and working.286
They might be forced to rear their children in a different way than they would
choose without discriminatory work structures.
Family-wage barriers
simultaneously compromise a woman’s right to pursue a career of her choosing
and her rights to bear and rear her children.
Even if a violation of a fundamental liberty interest is not ultimately
recognized in the context of family-wage barriers, raising the liberty interest
implicated will inform the EPC analysis. The Court has considered the liberty
interest at stake when examining a classification for equal protection purposes.287
Including a claim for a violation of substantive due process in a potential lawsuit
helps to educate the court about the social reality faced by working women with
caregiving responsibilities and the severe consequences of family-wage barriers
for women’s economic security, ultimately informing the equal protection
analysis. Further, the tension between the liberty interests implicated more
broadly demonstrates how the law excludes women’s experiences and treats
work as separate from caregiving.
The Supreme Court has clearly stated that strict scrutiny applies to
violations of substantive due process; the infringement must be narrowly
tailored to serve a compelling state interest.288 Applying the strict scrutiny
standard, and assuming that the Court would recognize an infringement of a
283. Conn v. Gabbert, 526 U.S. 286, 291–92 (1999) (stating “the liberty component of the
Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause includes some generalized due process right to choose
one’s field of private employment”); Engquist v. Or. Dep’t of Agric., 478 F.3d 985, 997–98 (9th Cir.
2007) (holding that there is substantive due process protection against government employer actions
that foreclose access to a particular profession to the same degree as government regulation).
284. Women’s right “to be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters so
fundamentally affecting a person as the decision whether to bear or beget a child,” Eisenstadt v.
Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972), is rooted in the body of reproductive rights precedent establishing a
fundamental right to procreation, Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 541 (1942), use contraception,
Griswald v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965), and terminate a pregnancy, Roe, 410 U.S. at 153.
“[Griswald v. Connecticut, Eisenstadt v. Baird, and Roe v. Wade] were interpreted as construing the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to confer a fundamental individual right to decide
whether or not to beget or bear a child.” Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 190 (1986).
285. Troxel, 530 U.S. at 65 (opining that “perhaps the oldest of the fundamental liberty interests
recognized” by the Supreme Court is “the right of parents to direct the upbringing of their children”);
see Back v. Hastings on Hudson Union Free Sch. Dist., 365 F.3d 107, 118, 118 n.6 (2d Cir. 2004)
(suggesting that a claim for a violation of one’s right to bear and rear children might be present in
caregiver discrimination cases).
286. See Int’l Union, UAW v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 499 U.S. 187, 204 (1991) (stating “women as
capable of doing their jobs as their male counterparts may not be forced to choose between having a
child and having a job”); Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632, 647–48 (1975) (striking state
regulation forcing pregnant teachers out of their jobs because the policy “unduly penalize[d] a female
teacher for deciding to bear a child”).
287. See, e.g., Skinner v. Okla., 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942) (relying on the fundamental nature of the
rights to marry and procreate to inform the EPC analysis).
288. See Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 301–02 (1993) (considering liberty interests when evaluating
a claim relying on the Fourteenth Amendment’s due process guarantee).
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substantive due process right, a state’s maintenance of an inflexible work
structure would not be narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest—
presumably optimum economic productivity—particularly if reasonable
alternatives existed. But courts do not always apply strict scrutiny to substantive
due process claims.289 Indeed, one difficulty in gauging the success of these
claims is the inconsistency with which courts apply any particular standard.
Nevertheless, even if a lower level of scrutiny applies, a viable argument is that
the infringement is unjustified if reasonable alternatives exist that are only mildly
burdensome for the state to adopt. Consequently, convincing a court that an
infringement of a substantive due process right has occurred is the greatest
obstacle to a substantive due process claim. Not only would recognition of the
rights violations in the context of women’s workplace attachment establish a new
claim, but courts’ analyses of whether there is an infringement are extremely
contextual, amorphous and conflated with a balancing of the state’s interest.
Therefore, it is difficult to predict how a court would receive such claims.
1. Right to Pursue an Occupation
A plaintiff will have the most difficulty establishing a violation of the right
to pursue a career of one’s choice, where infringement is limited to “extreme
cases” in which state action “effectively banned a person from a
profession . . . .”290 Only state regulations that affect a “complete prohibition of
the right to engage in a calling, and not [a] . . . brief interruption” have been held
unconstitutional in violation of the right to pursue a career.291 Family-wage
barriers do not overtly operate as a complete bar to employment or a profession,
making it difficult to establish a claim for an infringement of this right. However,
there are Title VII cases in which employers’ actions based on caregiver status
implicated the right to pursue an occupation
Consider Joann Trezza, whose claim for discriminatory failure to promote
based on her status as a mother survived summary judgment because her
employer failed to present evidence that men with children were also passed
over for a promotion.292 Trezza was twice passed over for a promotion in favor
of an unmarried woman without children and a married man with children.293
After not being promoted the first time around, Trezza asked her employer why
she did not get the job and was told “because she had a family they assumed she
would not be interested in the position.”294 The second time, Trezza urged a
Senior Vice President to review her employment record and provide her with a

289. Connecticut v. Gabbert, 526 U.S. 286, 291–92 (1999) (informing that the right to choose one’s
field of private employment is subject to reasonable government regulation); LaFleur, 414 U.S. at 640
(stating that government action interfering with the right to bear children cannot be needless,
arbitrary, or capricious); Hutchins v. D.C., 188 F.3d 531, 541 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (applying intermediate
scrutiny, in which the challenged regulation must be substantially related to an important
government interest, to a challenge based on parental rights).
290. Engquist v. Or. Dep’t of Agric., 479 F.3d 985, 997–98 (7th Cir. 2007).
291. Gabbert, 526 U.S. 286 at 292.
292. Trezza v. Hartford, Inc., No. 98-CIV-2205, 1998 WL 912101, at *7–8 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 30, 1998).
293. Id. at *1.
294. Id.
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reason for not being promoted.295 Two months later, Trezza was promoted.296
Several years later, Trezza requested to be considered for the Managing
Attorney position, after the previous Managing Attorney retired.297 For a third
time, she was not considered for the promotion, despite having the highest
performance evaluations of those with comparable seniority status.298 The
position remained open for an indefinite period, and was ultimately filled by a
woman without children and with “considerably less legal experience” than
Trezza.299 The discrimination Trezza faced based on her status as a mother
impeded her right to pursue her occupation.
Sometimes, employers rely on mistaken assumptions based on sex
stereotypes, which prevent caregivers from advancing in their careers. Laurie
Chadwick worked as a “Recovery Specialist” for an insurance company.300 She
had young children and was not promoted, despite being the presumed
frontrunner because of her greater years of experience and higher performance
reviews, and because she had already taken on some of the responsibilities of the
new position. 301 When a woman with older children was offered the job instead,
the hiring decision maker told Chadwick, “you’re going to school, you have the
kids and you just have a lot on your plate right now.”302 Chadwick was told that
the decision maker and other supervisors would feel “‘overwhelmed’ in the same
circumstances.”303 In reality, Chadwick’s husband was the primary caregiver of
their children, and he worked nights and weekends.304 The court noted that Title
VII does not protect against caregiving responsibilities. Without deciding
whether Chadwick could recover based on a “sex plus [caregiving]” theory of
liability, the court reversed summary judgment for the defendant by relying on
Chadwick’s claim of sex discrimination based on sex stereotyping, which was
established as sex discrimination by Price Waterhouse.305
Trezza’s and Chadwick’s cases demonstrate how employers’ decisions
based on an employee’s caregiver status and sex stereotypes about that status
jeopardize the right to pursue an occupation. Although these cases rely on a sexstereotyping theory of liability, employer actions based solely on caregiver status
also jeopardize a woman’s right to pursue an occupation.306 Establishing a claim
based on the right to occupation may be difficult because, even if the state’s

295. Id.
296. Id.
297. Id. at *2.
298. Id.
299. Id.
300. Chadwick v. WellPoint, Inc., 561 F.3d 38, 41 (1st Cir. 2009).
301. See id. at 41–42 (comparing the candidate who was offered the promotion and the plaintiff,
noting that the chosen candidate received lower performance reviews than the plaintiff, and had
worked fewer years than the plaintiff).
302. Id. at 42.
303. Id.
304. Id.
305. Chadwick, 561 F.3d at 46–47; see Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 235–36 (1989)
(stating that comments based on gender norms were evidence of sex-based stereotyping and could
indicate sex discrimination).
306. See, e.g., Chadwick, 561 F.3d at 46.

Maxwell Paginated Proof (Do Not Delete)

164 DUKE JOURNAL OF GENDER LAW & POLICY

12/13/2012 10:10 AM

Volume 20:127 2012

inflexible work structures and policies prevent a woman with caregiving
responsibilities from pursuing her state employment, or limit her career
advancement generally, the work structure maintained by the state action does
not permanently bar her employment. Regardless, asserting such a claim is
useful for framing the issue as one that has liberty dimensions, even if the court
ultimately decides that they are not encompassed by the constitution.
Assuming the state denied the right to pursue an occupation due to familywage barriers, the state’s maintenance of inflexible work structures would likely
be subject to a reasonableness review.307 The reasonableness of the state’s
interest in maintaining these barriers is questionable, particularly when
alternative work arrangements can be made. If an AWA can be made, the
employee can perform the job without hardship to the employer. Furthermore,
the irrationality of maintaining the family-wage barriers is accentuated if the
action is unrelated to the worker’s performance and rather a result of animus
towards caregivers.
Although a claim based on a right to pursue an occupation is unlikely to
succeed, this discussion highlights the way in which family-wage barriers have
liberty dimensions. Furthermore, it helps to bolster the unreasonableness of an
employer’s refusal, in many cases, to grant an AWA.
2. Right to Reproductive Freedom
Family-wage barriers might compel women to delay or forgo having
children at all, or they might prevent a woman from returning to work after
having a child,308 which infringes on her reproductive freedom. Reproductive
freedom jurisprudence primarily addresses the constitutionality of a state action,
taken to protect the “potentiality of human life”309 which incentivizes women to
have children, or purports to protect women or unborn children.310 In Cleveland
Board of Education. v. LaFleur, the Supreme Court held that a statute prescribing
mandatory maternity leave for pregnant women before and after the birth of a
child was unconstitutional.311 The Court stated that the mandatory leave policies

307. Connecticut v. Gabbert, 526 U.S. 286, 291–92 (1999) (indicating that the right to choose one’s
field of private employment is subject to reasonable government regulation).
308. As an example of how these fundamental rights collide in this context, the state’s interest in
women bearing children, deemed reasonable by the Court, and the policies implemented to further
that interest, compel women to have children and, as a result, force them out of the workforce due to
the inherently discriminatory work structure.
309. Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124 (2007).
310. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 876 (1992) (identifying a state interest in
protecting potential life); City of Akron v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, 462 U.S. 416, 450–51 (1983)
(holding that the state’s interest in protecting maternal health was not served by a law that required a
mandatory waiting period for abortions); Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 651 (1979) (finding
unconstitutional a parental consent requirement designed to ensure that minors contemplating
abortion act in their best interest); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152–53 (1973) (affirming the right to an
abortion); Griswald v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965) (finding unconstitutional a law
prohibiting distribution of birth control).
311. Compare Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632, 647–48 (1975), with Sokol v. Smith,
671 F. Supp. 1243, 1246–47 (W.D. Mo. 1987) (relying on Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977) to uphold a
state regulation prohibiting Medicaid funding for abortions that were not medically necessary, even
though funding for childbirth was provided, because the state has an interest in encouraging
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placed a heavy burden on the exercise of the right to bear children and
“needlessly, arbitrarily, or capriciously impinge[d] upon this vital area of a
[woman’s] constitutional liberty.”312
Like the state regulations at issue in LaFleur, inflexible work structures place
a heavy burden on women’s reproductive freedom. One-fifth of women aged
between forty and forty-four were childless in 2007; in 2001, “[n]early half of
women with annual incomes above $100,000 had no children . . . .”313 Certainly
some of these women made a conscious choice not to have children. However,
others end up without children because they cannot fit children into their worklife without sacrificing their professional accomplishments.314 This “complicated
calculus around the question of having children” defies the notion of
reproductive choice.315 When a choice of if and when to have a child is confined
by unreasonable workplace structures and policies that favor non-caregivers, it
becomes so limited that few or no options exist.
For example, a receptionist alleged that she was terminated for being
pregnant.316 Karen Rosales’s employer told her that it “wasn’t the best time” for
her to have a second baby, and “to not have a baby at [this] time.”317 When she
was fired while pregnant her employer explained, “maybe it’s best if [you are] at
home.”318 The court held that these comments created an issue of fact regarding
the employer’s true reason for terminating the receptionist.319 The court also
acknowledged that Rosales had a choice forced by her employer: keep her job or
have a child. If these were Rosales’s options, Rosales had almost no choice, and
the limited choice she had was dictated by her employer—a third party—
uninvolved in her pregnancy or the consequences that may arise from it.
Similarly, Patricia Leahy was fired from her position as a stock supervisor at
an Old Navy retail store after more than seven years of employment with the
company.320 Shortly after Leahy advised her supervisors that she was pregnant
with her second child, she was subjected to derogatory remarks about her work
and work hours.321 She submitted an accommodation request to her supervisor
that stated she could perform all of her duties up until her maternity leave, with
the exception of heavy lifting, climbing, and other strenuous activity.322 Her
supervisors harassed her to withdraw the letter, which Leahy refused to do.323

childbirth, and finding no violation of a fundamental right to bear children resulting from
unemployment compensation statute that provided unemployment compensation only to employees
who left their employment because of the type of work or the employer, indicating that women did
not have to choose between having a child and employment).
312. LaFleur, 414 U.S. at 640.
313. LERNER, supra note 9, at 90–91.
314. Id. at 91–92.
315. Id. at 92.
316. Rosales v. Keyes, No. 06-20471, 2007 WL 29245, at *2 (S.D. Fl. Jan. 3, 2007).
317. Id.
318. Id.
319. Id. at *6.
320. Leahy v. Gap, Inc., No. 07-2008, 2008 WL 2946007, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. July 29, 2008).
321. Id.
322. Id.
323. Id.
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She was subsequently terminated.324
Women might also feel compelled to terminate a pregnancy because of an
employer’s policy. Yaire Lopez almost made such a choice after her employer
fired her when her boss learned she was pregnant.325 Lopez, already a single
mother of two, was so desperate to keep her paycheck that she decided to have
an abortion. She only changed her mind because, as she said, “they were twins
and I didn’t want to feel guilty for two lives. So my thought was like forget about
my financial stuff. If I lose my house, if I lose everything I didn’t care at that
moment, I just wanted to continue with my pregnancy.”326 Her statement
demonstrates her limited options, the difficult choice she faced, and her dire
financial straits.
The animus expressed by employers in these cases extends beyond
pregnancy, and tells women that they need to choose between having children
and a career. As exemplified by the case of Shireen Walsh, women who become
mothers are more likely to be the target of discrimination than women without
children, and men.327 Although inflexible work structures and policies might be
necessary in some workplaces, many times they are based on the social
construction of work as defined by strict time norms. These inflexible work
structures “needlessly, arbitrarily, or capriciously impinge” on women’s right to
bear children.328 When reasonable alternatives exist that allow a woman to
remain a productive employee and freely choose whether and when to have
children, a state’s policy that maintains family-wage barriers infringes on a
woman’s substantive due process rights.
3. Right to Control One’s Child’s Upbringing
Finally, family-wage barriers might infringe on a parent’s right to control
her child’s upbringing.329 This right includes the responsibility to inculcate
“moral standards, religious beliefs, and elements of good citizenship.”330
Although in “certain circumstances the parental right to control the upbringing
of a child must give way to a school’s ability to control curriculum and the school
environment,”331 “so long as a parent adequately cares for his or her children (i.e.,
is fit), there will normally be no reason for the State to inject itself into the private
realm of family . . . .”332 A state can act to guard the general well-being of a child
by, for example, requiring vaccinations and school attendance or prohibiting

324. Id.
325. Lopez v. Bimbo Bakeries USA, Inc., No. CGC 05445104, 2009 WL 1090375, at *5–6 (Cal. App.
Dist. 1 Apr. 23, 2009).
326. LERNER, supra note 9, at 27–28; Bimbo Bakeries, 2009 WL 1090375 at *5.
327. See, e.g., Walsh v. Nat’l Computer Sys., 332 F.3d 1150 (8th Cir. 2003); see supra Section
IV(A)(2)(b).
328. Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632, 640 (1975).
329. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 233 (1972).
330. Id.
331. C.N. v. Ridgewood Bd. of Educ., 430 F.3d 159, 182 (3d Cir. 2005).
332. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 668 (2000) (plurality); see also Nunez v. City of San Diego, 114
F.3d 935, 952 (9th Cir. 1997) (finding a curfew law unconstitutional because it violated parents’ right
to raise their children without interference).
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child labor.333 But when a state seeks to impose “ideas of morality and gender
roles” on a child,334 alienates a child from the parent under circumstances that
“shock the conscience,”335 or fails to give deference to a parent’s decision about
the upbringing of her child, the state infringes on a parent’s rights.336 A state’s
maintenance of family-wage barriers infringes on a parent’s right to control her
children’s upbringing when she is forced to leave work to rear children. Familywage barriers might “coerce parents into permitting [the state] to impose on their
children . . . ideas of morality and gender roles”337 because they force mothers to
set an example that reinforces stereotypes of gender roles when they might not
otherwise choose to do so.
Perhaps that was not necessarily the case for Devorah Gartner, but she is a
mother who was forced to quit her job to care for her disabled newborn in the
way she and her husband felt was most appropriate for their family.338 Prior to
having their daughter, Devorah and Bob Gartner worked full-time.339 They
made a combined household income of over $100,000, owned their home, took
regular vacations, and generally lived comfortably.340
Devorah had a
complicated pregnancy and needed bed rest, which ultimately forced the
Gartners into medical debt.341 After their daughter was born, Devorah and Bob
continued to work full-time, hoping that they would be able to pay off their
debt.342 Devorah worked nights and Bob worked days; they handed off their
newborn in the midst of their commutes to and from work.343 But they soon
found out that their daughter had likely suffered a stroke in the uterus and
would require a physical therapy routine six times per day, in addition to usual
infant care.344
To meet the needs of their daughter in the limited window of time that they
had to ensure her best chance for progress, Devorah, who loved her job and
333. Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166–67 (1944).
334. Compare Miller v. Mitchell, 598 F.3d 139, 151 (3d Cir. 2010) (holding that plaintiff was likely
to succeed on the merits of her substantive due process claims for a violation of parental rights based
on the District Attorney’s requirement that her daughter’ attend a program about the morality of her
behavior at issue), with Anspach ex rel. Anspach v. City of Phila. Dep’t of Health, 503 F.3d 256, 262–63
(3d Cir. 2007) (finding no violation of parental rights when parents were not notified of their
daughters possible pregnancy after she sought advice from a health center counselor because the
daughter had a privacy interest and there was no coercive behavior that interfered with the parentchild relationship: the daughter could have told her parents and was not discouraged from doing so).
335. Rosenbaum v. Washoe Cnty., 663 F.3d 1071, 1079–80 (9th Cir. 2011) (finding no violation of
substantive due process where a parent was separated from his children for a short time during his
arrest).
336. Troxel, 530 U.S. at 68. See also, Hernandez ex rel. Hernandez v. Foster, 657 F.3d 463, 480–81
(7th Cir. 2011) (holding there was “a genuine dispute of fact about whether a reasonable person . . .
would have understood that continuing to hold [a minor] in protective custody violated the
[parent’s] clearly established constitutional rights”).
337. Miller v. Mitchell, 598 F.3d 139, 150–51 (3d Cir. 2010).
338. LERNER, supra note 9, at 13.
339. Id. at 7.
340. Id.
341. Id. at 8–10.
342. Id. at 11.
343. Id.
344. Id. at 11–12.
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earned almost twice what Bob earned at the time, asked to take a month off of
work.345 She was flatly refused; she had already used her sick and vacation
time.346 When again she requested time off and was denied, Devorah had no
choice but to quit her job, accruing even more debt.347
Additionally, when women attempt to fit their child caregiving
responsibilities into inflexible work structures, an employer might force them to
sacrifice their preferred child rearing styles or methods. Women may be forced
to place children in non-preferred care, or forego doctors’ appointments to
preserve employment. Consider Betty Jones, a low-income single mother who
found herself in a bind when her car broke down and she could not afford to fix
it.348 Because Jones could not jeopardize her employment as a custodian for a
hospital, her eleven-year old son became responsible for getting himself and his
younger sister to school on a city bus, and then to their grandmother’s house
after school.349 The grandmother took the kids to her evening job and dropped
them off at home at ten or eleven at night.350 The lack of flexibility of Jones’ job
ultimately forced her to risk her children’s safety.
If the plaintiff demonstrates an infringement of her rights, a court is likely to
apply intermediate scrutiny, which requires the government (i.e., the employer)
to show that the infringement is substantially related to an important
government interest.351 Again, the existence of reasonable alternatives attenuates
the substantial relation between the family-wage barriers and the state’s interest.
A claim for a violation of any of these rights has several obstacles, including
the analysis of balancing the state’s interest and that the challenges to state action
have mostly been to an overt act, usually a statute, which makes it easily
distinguishable from a state’s seemingly passive maintenance of family-wage
barriers. In light of the difficulty of establishing a claim for these liberty interest
violations, the true value of asserting them lies in further contextualization of the
issue of family-wage barriers as one of constitutional importance. Furthermore,
the assertion of these claims encourages courts to consider the state interests
involved in maintaining a work structure that is discriminatory against women,
particularly when reasonable alternatives exist. Even if a substantive due
process violation is not ultimately established, the analysis can help highlight the
unreasonableness of a state’s interest in maintaining an inflexible work structure
and the importance of the rights at issue. By raising these claims, a court can
begin to contextualize the way in which family-wage barriers infringe on
women’s liberty. This context thereby informs the court’s equal protection
analysis.352

345. Id. at 12.
346. Id. at 12–13.
347. Id. at 13.
348. Williams & Boushey, supra note 27, at 19.
349. Id.
350. Id.
351. See, e.g., Hutchins v. D.C., 188 F.3d 531, 541 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (applying intermediate scrutiny,
in which the challenged regulation must be substantially related to an important government interest,
to a challenge based on parental rights).
352. See supra Section IV(A).
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In Hibbs, the Supreme Court acknowledged that women’s role as primary
caregivers implicates women’s right to equal employment opportunity as
guaranteed by the Constitution. By challenging violations of this right caused by
family-wage barriers, the Court can begin to reconceptualize existing EPC
jurisprudence. Doing so will allow the Court to keep EPC jurisprudence in line
with women’s changed role as wage earner and caregiver. It will also help to
eradicate employment discrimination and gender stereotypes in the more subtle
forms as they exist today.
V. JUDICIAL REMEDIES TO ELIMINATE FAMILY-WAGE BARRIERS
A variety of remedies may be available to a plaintiff who establishes a
constitutional claim for a violation of her equal protection or substantive due
process rights. This section focuses on the judicial prophylactic remedy that
requires an employer to eliminate family-wage barriers for employees with
caregiving responsibilities. Prophylactic remedies are a subset of equitable relief
aimed at directing conduct affiliated with, rather than directly causing, a harm.353
As a result, these remedies affect a broader range of conduct than that targeted
by injunctive relief. The elimination of family-wage barriers might mean that
employers are required to offer AWAs or revise policies and practices that
penalize caregivers. For women who are only able to do their job with an AWA,
such a remedy would provide the structural change they need to work and fulfill
their caregiving responsibilities.
This remedy also challenges society’s
assumptions about the inherent nature of the work structure and characteristics
of an ideal worker.354 By directing employers’ conduct, a prophylactic remedy
can help change the way that employers perceive employees with caregiving
responsibilities and alleviate adverse employment actions based on caregiver
status, such as the hostile environment and disparate treatment exemplified
above.355 Changes to the work structure will also allow families to further
control how working adults in a household divide caregiving responsibilities.
Consequently, men might begin to shoulder more caregiving responsibilities and
the division of labor between genders at home could change, better supporting
women’s workplace attachment.
The elimination of family-wage barriers is necessary to guarantee the
fundamental rights to equal employment opportunity, to have and raise
children, and to pursue a career of one’s choice. Requiring AWAs redresses
violations of these rights by challenging family-wage barriers. This remedy
would “provide tangible meaning to . . . the contours of those rights”356 without
redefining fundamental rights or creating a new right.
The Supreme Court and Congress have a constitutional power to grant
prophylactic relief.357 Although prophylactic relief is most commonly viewed

353. Tracy A. Thomas, The Prophylactic Remedy: Normative Principles and Definitional Parameters of
Broad Injunctive Relief, 52 BUFF. L. REV. 301, 314 (2004).
354. See supra Section I.
355. See, e.g., Walsh v. Nat’l Computer Sys., 332 F.3d 1150 (8th Cir. 2003).
356. Thomas, supra note 353, at 311–12.
357. See Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 437–42 (2000) (implying that the Court and
Congress share power to create prophylactic remedies).
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and imposed as an exercise of Congressional power, a court’s Article III
jurisdiction over “[c]ases . . . [and] [c]ontroversies”358 grants it greater flexibility
to implement prophylactic remedies than Congress. While “judicial powers may
be exercised only on the basis of a constitutional violation,”359 “[o]nce a right and
a violation have been shown, the scope of a district court’s equitable powers to
remedy past wrongs is broad, for breadth and flexibility are inherent in equitable
remedies.”360 The Supreme Court defines constitutional rights and, when
prophylactic relief prescribed by the Court is constitutionally based, Congress
cannot supersede it.361 Congress’ prophylactic remedies must have “congruence
and proportionality” to the proven harm, and the Court ultimately determines
whether a Congressional remedy meets that standard.362
In addressing
Congressional power to prescribe prophylactic remedies in Hibbs, the Supreme
Court recognized that affirmative entitlements form a component of sex
discrimination law.363 However, the affirmative entitlements prescribed by
Congress thus far have fallen short of effecting full equality.364 This shortcoming
bolsters the point that “prophylactic relief is necessary, and even integral, to
effective judicial response to existing complex problems” because prophylactic
relief “allows the courts to address all of the factors” contributing to the wrong
with precision.365 Since courts can implement similar, broader, and more flexible
prophylactic relief than that provided by federal legislation thus far, Hibbs
provides a foundation for the judiciary’s use of affirmative entitlements.
Courts exercise their power to direct conduct affiliated with, rather than
directly causing, harm in a variety of contexts. For example, courts have
358. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2 (2006).
359. Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 16 (1971) (affirming prophylactic
remedies for school desegregation and stating that a school desegregation case does not differ
fundamentally from other cases involving the framing of equitable relief to repair the denial of a
constitutional right).
360. Id. at 15.
361. Dickerson, 530 U.S. at 437–42 (distinguishing between Court remedies that are
constitutionally and non-constitutionally based in analyzing whether a statute that undermined the
Court’s Miranda rule was a valid exercise of Congressional power).
362. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 520 (1997); see also Shelby Cnty., Ala. v. Holder, 811 F.
Supp. 2d 424, 457 (D.D.C. 2011) (articulating a three-step analysis to review Congress’ enactment of
remedial prophylactic legislation under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment as follows: (1)
identify a constitutional right that Congress sought to enforce when it enacted a challenged
legislation; (2) “examine whether Congress identified a history and pattern of unconstitutional
[conduct] by the [s]tate that justified the enactment of a remedial measure”; and (3) “decide whether
the challenged legislation constitutes an appropriate response to the identified history and pattern of
unconstitutional conduct,” i.e., whether is it congruent and proportional to targeted violation
(internal quotations omitted)).
363. See Nev. Dep’t of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 738 (2003); see also Dinner, supra note 27,
at 421 (acknowledging that “[c]ontemporary equal-protection doctrine has come to recognize that
affirmative social-welfare entitlements form an important component of sex discrimination law” and
that it will be necessary for Congress to build on this base and provide new interventions and
entitlements to advance sex equality).
364. See supra Sections I–II; see also Naomi Gerstel & Amy Armenia, Giving and Taking Family
Leaves: Right or Privilege?, 21 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 161, 164–65 (2009) (describing the limited impact of
FMLA and the ways that compliance with FMLA tends to exacerbate gender inequality in the
workplace).
365. Thomas, supra note 353, at 324.
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required changes in employment policies, trainings, and monitoring to alleviate
discrimination.366 These remedies establish organizational cultures designed to
avoid the harm and allow the defendant to self-regulate against future harms.367
Instead of simply compensating a single plaintiff with injunctive relief or
monetary damages, these changes can begin to break down family-wage barriers
on an institutional level.
Prophylactic remedies must be narrowly targeted at redressing the proven
harm, not at an ancillary social problem, and the conduct targeted must
demonstrate a causal link to the harm.368 A causal link exists when the conduct
bears a factual relationship and is of a sufficiently close degree to the harm.369
Where a constitutional violation has been found, the remedy does not exceed the
violation if the remedy is tailored to cure the “condition that offends the
constitution.”370 The Congressional findings favorably cited by the Supreme
Court in upholding the FMLA in Hibbs indicate that the FMLA’s deficiencies
have EPC implications.371 The findings pave the way for courts to exercise their
own prophylactic power to remedy the constitutional violations resulting from
family-wage barriers.
If the statistical evidence cited by Congress in enacting the FMLA indicates
the patterns of an individual state employer, a causal link between the conduct
ordered and the harm exists. The specific remedy of requiring an employer to
offer AWAs to people with caregiving responsibilities is an antidiscrimination
measure that furthers equality. This remedy protects fundamental rights,
without resulting in something more for the protected group. AWAs eliminate
family-wage barriers that exclude women from equal participation in the
workplace.372 Employers might criticize AWAs for being too costly, but evidence
suggests that offering AWAs “hold the promise to save money by decreasing the

366. See, e.g., Equal Emp’t Opportunity Comm’n v. Boh Bros. Constr. Co., No. 09-6460, 2011 WL
3648483, at *1–4 (E.D. La. Aug. 18, 2011) (requiring a sexual harassment policy, notice of the verdict,
and sexual harassment training to correct and prevent sexual harassment in the workplace); Equal
Emp’t Opportunity Comm’n v. D.C.P. Midstream, L.P., 608 F. Supp. 2d 115, 116 (D. Me. 2009)
(requiring training and monitoring in response to a claim of a racially hostile work environment);
Sherman v. Kasotakis, 314 F. Supp. 2d 843, 886 (N.D. Iowa 2004) (ordering a restaurant to adopt
policies and practices to eliminate race discrimination in public accommodations); Spina v. Forest
Pres. Dist. of Cook Cnty., No. 98-C-1393, 2002 WL 1769994, at *4 (N.D. Ill. July 31, 2002) (requiring the
defendant law enforcement agency to maintain separate locker facilities for female officers and adopt
a zero policy tolerance for violators of a sexual harassment policy).
367. Thomas, supra note 353, at 326.
368. Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S. 267, 280–82 (1977).
369. Id. at 280–81 (stating that the “nature and scope” of a remedy must be confined to the
constitutional harm); see, e.g., Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U.S. 467, 496 (1992) (stating “vestiges of
segregation must be so real that they have a causal link to the de jure violation being remedied”).
370. Milliken, 433 U.S. at 282.
371. Nev. Dep’t of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 735 n. 11 (2003); Family Medical Leave Act
29 U.S.C.A. § 2601(a) (2006).
372. This is akin to the argument that ADA accommodations are antidiscrimination measures that
challenge an arbitrary physical environment built around a particular person. See Michael Ashley
Stein, Same Struggle, Different Difference: ADA Accommodations as Antidiscrimination, 153 U. PA. L. REV.
579, 586–87 (2004) (presenting perceived limitations in the workplace as primarily social constructs
that are the result of bias, assumptions, or employer habit, but not because of actual physical
inability).
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costs associated with attrition, absenteeism, recruiting, quality control, and
productivity.”373 Consequently, the remedy not only furthers equality in the
workplace, but it may also be good for business.
The court’s power to impose prophylactic remedies, and their use in parallel
contexts, supports judicial remedies for family-wage barriers. Prophylactic
remedies specifically target conduct affiliated with violations of fundamental
rights and are necessary to ensure the practical enforcement of women’s equal
protection and substantive due process rights. If the courts do not remedy
family-wage barriers, and women remain society’s primary caregivers, women’s
equal protection and substantive due process rights will be jeopardized because
women will be forced to choose between work and caregiving. The imposition
of AWAs would change the structure of work for all employees and facilitate
women’s workplace attachment while challenging traditional sex roles.
CONCLUSION
Impact litigation must be used in conjunction with other methods of causelawyering to eliminate family-wage barriers to workplace attachment. This
article provides a backdrop for advocates to develop a cohesive litigation
strategy for pursuing these claims. As these strategies develop, certain claims or
theories might succumb to others, depending on the many variables at play.
Regardless, litigation is integral to recognizing the fundamental rights are at
stake at the intersection of caregiving and family-wage work structures. In Hibbs,
the Supreme Court validated the use of prophylactic remedies in achieving
women’s employment equality through structural changes to the workplace.374
The Court acknowledged that gender equality issues arise at the intersection of
work and caregiving. Thus, Hibbs lays a foundation for a court to use its Article
III powers to prescribe these types of remedies and break down family-wage
barriers confronted by the women forced to choose between work and caring for
their children.

373. Williams & Segal, supra note 71, at 87–88.
374. Nev. Dep’t of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 735 (2003).

